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This thesis analyzes the relationship between the war on drugs and official 
corruption in Colombia. Two variables are used in the study. The first one is official 
corruption in Colombia, which is measured using the number of articles on official 
corruption published by Colombia's newspaper El Tiempo and The Economist 
magazine. The second variable is action against illegal drugs. This variable is 
measured by a combination of the Colombian National Police budget and the level of 
commitment to act against the problem. 
To understand what war on drugs is, a chapter describing drug policies of both 
the United States and Colombia is included. On policy issues, each country has its 
own perspective of the problem. While the United States believes that the main 
problem is on the supply side, Colombian people and officials think that the problem 
is more demand oriented. 
Results show that official corruption in Colombia is linearly correlated with 
action against illegal drug trafficking. If the level of action against illegal drags 
increases, official corruption increases but not in the same proportion. Regression 
analysis revealed that 28.2 percent of the variation on official corrupton is explained 
by variation in the action against illegal drugs. The analysis also led to the conclusion 
that the Colombian government is acting against the problem, and that drug-related 
corruption is not the only kind of official corruption in the country. Recommendations 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine if a relationship between the war against 
illegal drug trafficking and the level of official corruption in Colombia exists. Most studies 
related to the drug problem focus on production quantities of drugs, the quantity of illegal 
drugs smuggled into the United States, the problem of domestic consumption, and the 
economic impact in both consuming and producing countries. This study addresses one of 
the many social effects that the war on illegal drugs is having in Colombian society: official 
corruption. 
A.   BACKGROUND 
Illegal drug trafficking is recognized by the international community as one of the 
most significant problems of modern society. Because of this, a variety of methods to attack 
the problem have been developed. Methods such as criminalization of trafficking and use, 
decriminalization, legalization, demand reduction, supply reduction, and several 
combinations of these are widely used throughout the world. So far the most popular, and 
the one currently in place, is the criminalization of illegal trafficking and use combined with 
the reduction of supply by the use of force. This approach, as all others, has unavoidable 
consequences both in the United States and in the producing1 countries. One of these 
consequences is, without a doubt, the spread of corrupt practices by government officials 
in response to bribery and intimidation by wealthy drug dealers attempting to ensure that 
their business runs smoothly. 
To establish the relationship between the war on drugs and the level of official 
corruption in Colombia requires the development of a method to measure both variables. 
Once that information is available, analytical techniques can be used to find their level of 
correlation. 
1
    The author wants to clarify that when the words "producing countries" is used, it does not mean that the 






The results will help policymakers better understand the possible consequences of 
the decisions they make, and on policies they should support. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
The main objective of the present study is to find if the war on drugs, defined as the 
effort against illegal drug production, trafficking, and consumption, has an effect in the level 
of official corruption in Colombia. 
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The primary research question for this thesis is: is there a correlation (relationship) 
between the efforts against illegal drug trafficking and the level of official corruption in 
Colombia? Before answering this question, it is necessary to address the following 
supporting questions: What is the war on drugs? What is the United States anti-drug policy, 
and how has it evolved over the years? What kind of influence does the United States have 
over anti-drug policy decisions in Colombia? What is the Colombian policy to attack this 
problem? What is corruption and how it can be measured? Answers to these questions will 
provide the background needed to establish a relationship between the two variables in 
question. 
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Scope 
Given the weak social and economic conditions of most illegal-drug producing 
countries, the war on drugs exerts a big impact on: the economy, the crime levels, violence, 
corruption, environment, drug abuse, and in general, in every aspect of the social context. 
Colombia which is one of the biggest producing countries does not escape this situation. 
The study concentrates on the effect that the effort against illegal drug trafficking 
(war on drugs) has, if any, on the level of official corruption in Colombia. Therefore, official 
corruption, in this context, includes all corrupt practices by government officials, related or 
not to the narcotics trade problem. 
2 
When the term action against illegal drugs is mentioned in the analysis chapter of the 
thesis, it refers to actions and policies taken by the Colombian government in this area. A 
summary of significant changes and evolution of the United States anti-drug policy is 
included in Chapter II, and provides the necessary background to understand how the U.S. 
policy affects Colombian government decisions regarding illegal drugs. 
2. Limitations 
The most significant limitation in the conduct of the analysis is the lack of a reliable 
mechanism to measure corruption. This situation requires the development of a method to 
measure corruption, with a corresponding set of assumptions to support it. The assumptions 
made are explained in the following sub-section. 
Another important limitation was the difficulty in obtaining information on the 
number of articles regarding corruption and government officials published by the 
Colombia's newspaper El Tiempo due to the lack of a computerized information system at 
El Tiempo prior to 1990. Because of this, the data for the analysis is from 1990 to 1995. 
3. Assumptions 
The level of effort against illegal drugs and the level of official corruption are the 
central points of the thesis. Therefore, mechanisms to measure those are of the most 
importance. Both variables are very complex, and there is no perfect unit of measure to rely 
on. Because of this, several assumptions are made to measure the variables. To measure the 
level of action against illegal drug trafficking, the assumption is made that in addition to the 
budget, the commitment to act against the problem plays an important role. Commitment is 
the level of motivation that the government and law enforcement agencies have at a 
particular point in time. A detailed explanation of this concept is included in Chapter IV. On 
the corruption side, the assumption is that the number of articles regarding corruption in 
Colombia and Colombian government officials published by the Colombia's newspaper El 
Tiempo from 1990 to 1995, and by The Economist magazine from 1985 to 1995, represent 
a good approximation of the level of official corruption in Colombia. 
Another important assumption is that both publications are unbiased regarding 









To define the variables, the study is based on social research techniques. Analytical 
techniques are used in the analysis of the data. For variable definition, the first set of 
information required is the historical data regarding the United States and Colombian policy 
towards illegal drugs. This will help us visualize the significant changes and the evolution 
of policies over the years. The information is collected using official publications available 
from both governments, and previous research in the topic. As mentioned earlier, 
information regarding official corruption in Colombia is collected with a detailed search on 
articles referring to corruption and government officials published by the Colombia's 
newspaper El Tiempo and The Economist magazine. 
This thesis does not attempt to develop a perfect mechanism to measure corruption; 
the methodology used is to conduct the analysis and develop a trend of the level of official 
corruption in Colombia using the information and assumptions described above. This way 
there is no need to assign numerical values to corruption. Then, the trend will be compared 
to action against illegal drugs in the same time frame. The two variables are compared using 
analytical techniques. More specifically, the statistical package MNITAB is used to find the 
relation between the two. 
F. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
During the collection of data regarding anti-drug policies of both, the United States 
and Colombia, interesting facts were found. The United States policy on illegal drugs has 
concentrated mainly on the reduction of the supply abroad, with less emphasis on the 
problem of internal demand. Although there is a slight increase in the emphasis on internal 
demand reduction since 1994, (see Table 1) the general perception of the American people 
and officials is that the main problem is abroad. 
If we look at the supply/demand ratio (Table 1), it shows a trend since 1989 of a 
gradual reduction in the percent of budget allocated to supply-side actions. Conversely, since 
1989, there is a steady increase in the percent of the budget allocated to demand reduction. 
INIT 
4 
In contrast with the United States' view of the problem, Colombian people and 
officials think that the main problem is the demand for drugs in the United States and in 
several European countries. Nevertheless, since the late 1980s, Colombian government 
officials have publicly accepted that the supply of illegal drugs is also a major component 
of the problem; still, the general perception in Colombia is demand oriented. Regarding 
policy actions, Colombia's anti-drug policy has been reactive to U.S. pressures and to the 
impact of special events such as the assassination of government officials, judges or political 
figures. 
In terms of the relationship between the war on drugs and the level of official 
corruption in Colombia (the main purpose of this thesis), the analysis of the data indicate that 
the two variables are linearly correlated. In other words, if the level of action against illegal 
drugs as defined in Chapter IV, increases, the level of official corruption in Colombia 
increases as well, but not proportionally. The level of correlation is 28.2 percent, indicating 
that not all official corrupt practices in Colombia are related to illegal drug trafficking. A 
complete review of the findings is included in Chapters V and VI. 
G.       ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
The following is a succinct discussion of the topics covered in the thesis and how 
they are organized to provide the background to answer the research question. Chapter II 
provides a brief description of the anti-drug policies of the United States and Colombia over 
the last twenty years. The description will help the reader to understand the war on drugs and 
how related policies have evolved over the years. The chapter is divided in two sections, each 
one devoted to each country. In Section B, Colombian Drug Policy, a subsection called U.S.- 
Colombian relations examines how illegal drug trafficking has affected the relationship 
between the two countries. Chapter III describes some of the most common definitions of 
corruption and defines a working definition of the topic in the framework of the study. Once 
the necessary background regarding the war on drugs and corruption is provided, the next 
step is to explain how the data to conduct the analysis was collected and how it is used to 
establish the relationship between the two variables. This information is included in Chapter 
 
t
m   
 
5 
IV. The chapter is in three sections. The first one includes an historical review of the 
Colombian Defense Ministry budget since 1985. The second section explains the developing 
of the anti-drug action curve which is the basic independent variable in the analysis. The 
information used to measure corruption is described in the third section. This measure of 
corruption is the dependent variable in the correlation analysis. Chapter V explains the 
sequence and methodology used, and the results of the data analysis. It also contains a 
section with brief statistical definitions and concepts to help non-statistical oriented readers 
understand the analysis. Conclusions and recommendations for further studies are included 
in Chapter VI. The list of articles on official corruption published by El Tiempo used in the 
analysis is included in Appendix A. Appendices B and C summarizes the data and numerical 
values of the variables in the regressions using LEVEL] (corruption measured by the number 
of articles on official corruption in Colombia published by El Tiempo) and LEVEL2 
(corruption measured by the number of articles on official corruption in Colombia published 
by The Economist) as dependent variables respectively. 
I . e c apter is i  t ree secti ns. e first e i cludes a  ist rical re ie  f the 
l ia  efense inistr  dget si ce 5. e second section e lai s the e el i  
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II. THE WAR ON DRUGS 
To understand what the war on drugs is, and what its potential consequences are, it 
is necessary to review the basic policies driving it. This chapter provides a brief description 
of the drug policies of both the United States' and Colombia's governments since 1975. 
Instead of giving a detailed description of these policies, the main goal is to identify the 
highlights and any major changes in policy. 
A.        UNITED STATES DRUG POLICY 
Since 1969, the United States has given high priority to reducing the inflow of illegal 
drugs from foreign sources. Efforts to reduce the supply of narcotics have been the primary 
impetus behind U.S. drug policy, and its importance relative to other approaches has been 
increasing ever since. The position of Senior Advisor for International Narcotics Matters was 
created in 1971, with an assistant secretary rank. The senior advisor, representing the 
Secretary of State, directs the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (Office of Drug 
Abuse Policy, 1978). [Ref. 3] 
Drug policies are implemented through United States regional bureaus and the 
various embassies. In Latin American drug-producing countries, the Bureau of Inter- 
American Affairs and the U.S. embassies play a very important role in coordinating and 
supporting U.S. drug policy. The following is a summary of Craig's [Ref. 3] explanation 
of the structure: a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State supervises anti-drug efforts in the 
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs. Each embassy has a senior diplomat acting as narcotics 
coordinator; he or she chairs a working committee composed of representatives from the 
Drug Enforcement Agency, Customs, the Agency of International Development, 
Agriculture, Defense, CIA, Legal Affairs, and the United States International 
Communication Agency. In countries such as Colombia, which produce large amounts of 
drugs, foreign service officers who are considered special assistants to the ambassador work 




task of creating awareness and to convince the host government to take action against illegal 
drug cultivation and trafficking~the first steps toward implementing policy. 
In the late 1960s, marijuana production began to take off in Colombia as a result of 
the increasing demand for it in the United States. [Ref. 1] Then, in the early 1970s, the U.S. 
government tightened drug enforcement along the border with Mexico. Thus, the task of 
convincing the Colombian government officials, Congress, and military officers that a 
Colombian anti-drug effort was, first and foremost, in their nation's best interest was very 
difficult. At that time, Colombia's perception of the problem was demand-oriented. President 
Alfonso Lopez Michelsen (1974-1978) reminded the United States that the root problem was 
theirs, not Colombia's. Drug traffic, said Lopez, "never would have acquired its actual 
dimensions, if a permanent number of customers did not exist in the United States who 
supply large international chains with financing that have their origin in the very same United 
States" (Excelsior, 1978d). [Ref. 3, p.251] 
In 1982, President Reagan, in response to domestic pressures to do something about 
the increasing U.S. drug problem, declared "war" on drugs. The Reagan administration's 
strategy was a full-scale attack against drugs, and against production, processing and 
trafficking abroad. Political parties and Congress strongly backed the initiative. The anti- 
drug campaign was also supported by intensive diplomatic efforts to gain the cooperation of 
producing countries, in some cases with threats of sanctions against countries judged 
uncooperative—or not cooperative enough. 
In 1988, with the apparent failure of the anti-drug policy and with the November 
congressional and presidential elections approaching, the U.S. Congress enacted the Anti- 
Drug Abuse Act. The Act was the first piece of legislation to go beyond Reagan's supply- 
side programs to focus more explicitly on the demand side of the problem, assigning 50% 
of the federal anti-drug funding for fiscal year 1990 to domestic demand control and 
enforcement, as opposed to 30% in Reagan's policy. [Ref. 4, p.3] This major policy change 
in the war on drugs came as a natural response to the "failure" of Reagan's policy to achieve 
tangible results over two presidential terms. The effect of the changes has not been fully 
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observed, in part because they didn't last long: after his election, President Bush reverted to 
the supply side as the main focus of U.S. anti-drug efforts. 
In September 1989, President Bush revealed the National Drug Control Strategy in 
compliance with section 1005 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. The strategy contained 
both domestic and international dimensions. The objective was to reduce the amount of 
cocaine, marijuana, heroin, and other dangerous drugs estimated to be entering the United 
States by 15% within two years, and by 60% within 10 years. [Ref. 5] The strategy included 
a number of international components which differed from previous policies. Perl [Ref. 5], 
summarizes the policy in four points: (1) provide limited economic assistance to producing 
countries [first time]; (2) concentrate more on disrupting the activities of the trafficking 
organizations, and less on disrupting the activities of farmers; (3) encourage increased 
Andean nation military involvement in counter-narcotics operations; and (4) enhance U.S. 
military support to host nation counter-narcotics forces. The strategy defines the national 
priorities on seven main areas: the criminal justice system; drug treatment; education, 
community action, and the workplace; international initiatives; interdiction efforts; research, 
and intelligence. Due to the nature of and scope of this thesis, a summary of the international 
initiatives and interdiction efforts priorities is presented. [Ref. 11] 
• Disruption and dismantlement of drug-trafficking organizations. 
• Reduced cocaine supply. Law enforcement, military, and economic assistance will 
be provided to the three Andean cocaine-producing countries to isolate major 
coca-growing areas; to block delivery of chemicals used for cocaine processing; 
to destroy cocaine hydrochloride processing labs; and to dismantle the trafficking 
organizations. Efforts in transit areas will be improved and Joint Intelligence 
Collection Centers will be created in the Caribbean Basin. 
• Reduced heroin supply through efforts to convince other countries to exert 
influence on opium growers and reduce heroin processing and distribution. 
• Reduced marijuana supply through strengthened foreign law enforcement and 
eradication, and through efforts to discourage minor producing nations from 
becoming major producers. 
• U.S. assistance and encouragement for European community and multi-lateral 
efforts aimed at source country and transit country production and distribution, 
and at European consumption. European community support against international 















• Other international objectives: 
• Elevation of drugs as a bilateral foreign policy issue. 
• U.S. ratification of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic 
in Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, along with other pending 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties. Other nations will be urged to ratify the 
Convention. 
• Support for the U.S. foreign aid certification process in order to achieve 
more effective supply- and transit-country compliance with American drug 
control objectives. 
• Bilateral and multi-lateral efforts against international money-laundering 
activities. 
• Interdiction Priorities: 
• Development of a comprehensive information-based approach to Federal 
air, maritime, land, and Port-of-Entry interdiction. 
• Upgraded intelligence support to interdiction, through intensified 
interdiction-specific investigations and undercover operations. 
• Enhanced computer support to interdiction through acceleration of 
machine readable documentation programs; installation of document 
machine readers at appropriate Ports of Entry; and development of the 
International Border Interdiction System (IBIS) and other computerized 
border information systems. 
• Creation of interagency/interdisciplinary teams to analyze and target 
smuggling modes, methods, and routes. 
• Concentration on high-value individuals and shipments. 
• Review of existing methods for deterring air smugglers. 
• Improved operations aimed at money couriers and shipments. 
• Improve container inspection techniques and intelligence. 
• Enhanced border systems, operations, and activities. 
• Dramatically reduced document fraud, especially fraudulent use of U.S. 
birth certificates and other "breeder documents." 
• Expanded use of drug detection dogs, anti-vehicle barriers, and container 
inspections. 
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• Provision of automatic exclusion authority and general arrest authority to 
Immigration and Naturalization Service officers. 
• Improved detection and monitoring systems and secure operations 
procedures. 
• Expanded secure communications systems. 
A major component of the Bush strategy was the "Andean initiative," designed to 
enhance assistance (economic, military, and for law enforcement) to Bolivia, Colombia and 
Peru. The initiative was an attempt to strengthen these countries' political/economic 
conditions and their capabilities to take effective action against narcotics; to increase their 
military and law enforcement organizations; to isolate coca-growing regions, destroy labs, 
and block delivery of precursor chemicals. By including the economic assistance program, 
the administration gained the cooperation of producing countries, generating multilateral 
consensus on the necessity to take action against drugs. 
An Andean Drug Summit Meeting was held in Cartagena, Colombia in February 
1990. At the conclusion of the meeting, the presidents of the United States, Colombia, 
Bolivia, and Peru issued a communique stating their willingness to cooperate with one 
another in a concerted attack on the drug trade, and to exchange information in such areas 
as movement of precursor chemicals and money laundering. [Ref. 5, p.125] 
Although the main focus of U.S. policy was on supply-side actions, the Bush strategy 
was the first to include economic assistance to major producing countries. Producing 
countries' governments had been requesting such assistance so that they could follow the 
United States anti-drug policy effectively. Another key aspect of the policy was the desire 
to concentrate more on the disruption of trafficking activities than on the eradication of 
crops. 
The Clinton anti-drug policy, released by the end of 1993, also contained both 
domestic and international components. Within the United States, the budget provides 
resources to link drug policy with other facets of the Administration's domestic policy, 
especially programs to stimulate economic growth, reform health care, curb youth violence, 
and empower communities. [Ref. 12] On the international front, the policy represents a 








problem as just another element of foreign policy, putting it on the same level as democracy, 
protection of human rights, and the support of marked-based economic growth. The plan 
suggests a gradual transition from policies that emphasize interdiction as the primary strategy 
(in transit zones), to ones that stress U.S. cooperation with producing countries that 
demonstrate the willingness to take action against narcotraffic. [Ref. 6] 
Perl describes the major highlights of Clinton's international strategy in five main 
points: (1) linkage to other foreign policy objectives: illegal drug trade generates corrupting 
influences which, if not controlled, will undermine other foreign policy goals, such as 
democracy, human rights, rule of law, and a clean environment; (2) primary focus on 
cocaine; marijuana is not addressed; (3) a shift away from transit zone interdiction towards 
enforcement programs in producing countries; (4) emphasis on democratic institution 
building: the United States will support anti-drug programs in host countries that help to 
strengthen institutions that are compatible with democratic government; (5) host nation 
programs linked to foreign political will and likelihood of success: the United States will pay 
particular attention to, and implement programs in, countries that demonstrate a serious 
commitment to, and a likelihood of success in, anti-drug efforts. 
The Clinton administration's plan has two important innovations, one on the 
domestic front and the other on the international. In linking the drug problem with the 
United States' general goals, and citing it as an important factor in achieving those goals, the 
government seems to recognize that the demand side is also important in the overall effort 
to counter the problem. The major change in international policy is the intention to gradually 
de-emphasize interdiction in transit zones, and to increase U.S. cooperation with host 
countries by assisting them with counter-narcotics training, economic aid, and crop 
eradication. Note that there is a major shift from the Bush plan, which concentrated on 
trafficking activities as opposed to crop eradication. Despite these differences, the overall 
burden of supply and demand remained unchanged during the first two years of Clinton's 
administration: approximately 65% of the budget to supply and 35% to demand-side actions 
(See Table 1). 
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The National Drug Control Strategy for 1995, released on February 1994 included 
significant emphasis on demand reduction programs, particularly treatment services for 
hardcore users and prevention activities for children and adolescents. Recognizing the strong 
linkage between hardcore drug use and its health and crime consequences to society, the drug 
control budget increases funds for drag treatment to a record level. [Ref. 12] For 1995, the 
budget request included 58.6 percent for supply, and 37.36 percent for demand reduction 
programs, indicating a slight change in the priorities. Table 1 includes the drug control 
budget (supply/demand ratio) from 1985 to 1995. The information contained in Table 1 
reveals an interesting pattern: beginning from 1990, the budget assignment for supply side 
activities is gradually declining, while the demand portion is increasing steadily, expressing 
perhaps an unnoticed long-run policy change toward demand side programs. 
SUPPLY/DEMAND RATIO: 
TOTAL U.S. FEDERAL DRUG CONTROL BUDGET 
FY 1985 - FY 1995 (PERCENTAGES) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Supply* 68.5 69.5 70.2 68.0 68.4 67.2 65.3 64.3 64.2 61.9 58.6 
Demand 28.0 27.1 26.5 28.3 28.1 29.5 30.6 31.4 31.7 33.9 37.4 
Research 03.5 03.4 03.3 03.7 03.5 03.3 04.1 04.3 04.1 04.2 04.0 
(both) 
Total 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
* Supply figures include both domestic and international supply-reduction efforts. 
SOURCE: ONDCP. Calculated from "National Drug Control Budget by Function," Budget Authority figures 
(FY 1985-FY 1994 actual; FY 1995 requested), National Drug Control Strategy - Budget Summary, White 
House, February 1994, pp.184-187. 
Table 1. Federal Drug Control Budget 
In summary, United States policy on illegal drugs has concentrated mainly on the 
reduction of the supply abroad, with less emphasis on the problem of internal demand. 









implementation of plans has changed from government to government, the essence has 
remained unchanged. 
B.        COLOMBIAN DRUG POLICY 
Colombian Policy on illegal drugs has changed several times in recent years. The 
basic pattern of change can be related to some extent to the level of pressure that the United 
States applied to gain the Colombian government's commitment to fight the war on drugs. 
This section explains the evolution ofthat policy since the late 1970s, and the positions of 
each government since the 1970s. 
A good point to begin the description of the Colombian anti-drug policy is the 
statement made by President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen (1974-1978) in February 1978 
reminding America's public and officials that they were the root of the drug problem, not 
Colombia's (see Section A of this chapter). In general, that was the position of Colombia's 
politicians and government officials in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. That perception 
has changed over time; now, many people in Colombia believe that the drug problem is not 
only United States' problem but also Colombia's. Although the general perception has 
evolved, Colombian officials had never agreed to the idea that the Colombian side of the 
problem (supply) is larger than the United States' side (demand). 
The following section provides a short review of U.S.-Colombian relations and sets 
the background to understand the evolution of drug policy in Colombia, and the role that 
American pressure has played in that evolution. 
1. U.S.-Colombian Relations 
Colombia's and United States' friendly relations during the nineteenth century were 
complicated during the first two decades of the twentieth century as a result of the U.S. 
intervention in the separation of Panama from Colombia. This situation generated diplomatic 
tension; however, economic ties suffered little. As Hanratty and Meditz [Ref. 1, p.238] state, 
"the United States was the major market for Colombia's leading export and source of 
revenue: coffee." After 1920, President Marco F. Suarez (1918-1921) adopted a policy that 
linked Colombia's destiny to the United States, through geography, trade, and democracy. 
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This approach was backed by subsequent governments, but especially by Enrique Olaya 
Herrera (1930-1934). During World War II, relations between Washington and Bogota were 
very good. Although Colombia's commitment to the Allied cause didn't include sending 
troops, the strategic position of the country2 and its pro-allied stance were helpful to Allied 
Nations. Colombia also participated in the UN Force in the Korean War with one Army 
battalion and three frigates. Colombia was the only Latin American country to send troops 
to the UN Emergency Force in the Suez conflict (1956-1958). All this support for the U.S. 
and international organizations strengthened the relations between Washington and Bogota 
and led to more cooperation and economic assistance. 
During the 1960s, President Kennedy's "Alliance for the Progress" program toward 
Latin America that called for economic assistance and social change by recipient countries 
played a key role in keeping relations on friendly and cooperative terms. Nevertheless, 
leading economists and government officials stated that Colombia's increasing dependence 
on the United States market was causing problems for the Colombian economy. Despite 
some isolated events, the U.S. and Colombia maintained a good level of understanding and 
cooperation during the period before 1975. 
2. Colombian Anti-Drug Policy 
This section explains the environment and the actions that each Colombian 
Government took regarding drug activities since President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen (1974- 
1978). Before proceeding, it is important to make clear that under the Colombian 
Constitution, the President is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces,3 and has full 
authority and responsible for foreign relations. Some international decisions such as 
declaring war and ratification of treaties need Congress's approval. 
3 
Colombia is located in the north west comer of South America, has coasts both in the Atlantic and Pacific 
oceans, and is very close to the Panama canal from both coasts. The strategic value of this location is that 
of control of the maritime lines of traffic. The Colombian Navy was involved in the control of such transit 
areas during World War II, and there is evidence of the sinking of one German submarine during that 
period. 







Prior to 1974, anti-drag efforts in Colombia were isolated and didn't have a coherent 
goal. When President Lopez took office, the police and other enforcement agencies were 
corrupt. Effective actions in the anti-drug field were difficult because some people involved 
in the drug trade held official office. During his government, President Lopez changed key 
personnel in organizations like the Administrative Department of Security (DAS) and in the 
security police, trying to reduce levels of corruption that existed in those agencies. As stated 
in Section A, President Lopez believed that the problem was the U.S. demand; therefore, he 
was not willing to cooperate decisively with the U.S. policy. 
In 1977, in response to U.S. pressure, President Lopez initiated an expanded 
campaign against cocaine traffic. The campaign, summarized by Bagley [Ref. 2], consisted 
basically in crop eradication, assignment of anti-narcotics units of the National Police to 
seaports and airports, and the reorganization of the judicial police. U.S. pressure was 
supported by a security assistance package costing $3.7 million. [Ref. 2] Presidential 
Candidate Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala opposed the decision and launched a frontal assault 
against the expanded campaign during the presidential campaign. 
On April 1978, in the thick of presidential campaigning, commentator Morley Safer 
of CBS "60 Minutes" revealed that a confidential memorandum to President Carter from Dr. 
Peter Bourne charged two Colombian Ministers and a presidential candidate with 
involvement in narcotics: General Abraham Varon Valencia, Minister of Defense; Oscar M. 
Montoya, Minister of Labor; and Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala, the front-running Liberal Party 
candidate. Their denials of the allegations were categoric and swift. [Ref. 3] President 
Lopez strongly supported the Presidential Candidate and the two Ministers denying the 
accusations. Turbay Ayala, in a letter to U.S. Ambassador in Colombia Diego Asencio, 
stated: 
Both President Lopez and Mr. Bourne categorically denied the false 
allegations, which are the result of the dirty campaign against my reputation. 
[Ref. 3] 
Asencio's reply, read in part: 
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It is the position of my government that there is no proof that you may have 
had any part in the drug traffic. I find incomprehensible and absurd the use 
of any allegation of your participation in the drug traffic (Miami Herald, 
1978b). [Ref. 3] 
Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala became President in 1978 after facing the accusations of 
drug traffic involvement described previously. The United States took advantage of this 
situation and promptly initiated political pressures for a frontal assault against narco-traffic. 
Although he opposed President Lopez's anti drug campaign, in his inaugural address he 
declared war on traffickers and promised restoration of law and order. Turbay's commitment 
against drug trafficking improved relations between the U.S. and Colombia. On September 
6, the government promulgated the "statute of security." The purpose was to set a legal 
security environment that would permit democratic institutions to operate and defend 
themselves. It would become, said Procurator General Guillermo Gonzalez Charry, "a battle 
without quarter against the two principal problems of immorality that plague Colombia: 
administrative corruption and narcotics traffic" (Excelsior, 1978a). 
The drug policy under Turbay's Presidency had four important aspects. First, attempts 
to discover the real extent of the problem were taken for the first time, and, as a consequence, 
the problem was better understood. This was the first time that a Colombian government 
accepted that drug trafficking could have a big impact on both the economy and the society 
of the country. Craig, explained the situation with the following words: "A lion's share of 
the blame was still laid at Washington's feet, but Bogota accepted its share for the first time." 
[Ref. 3] 
Second, President Turbay ordered the military to assume the major role in the anti- 
drug efforts.4 The military participated in "Operacion Fulminante,"in the Guajira Peninsula, 
with around 4,000 personnel, including three battalions, supporting units, naval ships, and 
aircraft. The operation was a frontal attack against marijuana cultivation, drug smuggling, 
4
    This was the first time that Military units assumed a major role in anti-drug activities. The military had 






and guerrilla activities in the northern departments. Results were very impressive: over 6,000 
tons of marijuana and nearly 300 aircraft and vessels were seized [Ref. 2], thus increasing 
the prestige of the Military Forces. 
Third, the anti-narcotics unit of the police were increased in size, received more 
responsibility, and were granted salary increases. Increasing the salaries was absolutely 
necessary to reduce the level of bribery and related corruption. The salary of a police agent 
(agente de policia), which is the lowest rank in the Colombian National Police, was at that 
time equivalent to the minimum wage: 2,340.00 Colombian pesos, about U.S. $66 a month. 
This salary was not enough to provide for the minimum requirements of a family maintaining 
a decent standard of living. It was common to see policemen and criminals living in the same 
neighborhoods and in the same precarious circumstances. This situation made policemen 
susceptible to accepting bribes, thus increasing the level of corruption. 
Fourth, President Turbay agreed in 1979 to a U.S.-Colombian extradition treaty that 
permitted Colombian traffickers accused of crimes in the Unites States to be extradited and 
tried in the U.S. courts. 
Although relations with the United States suffered a setback when in 1980 the 
President ordered the military to abandon the efforts on the Guajira Peninsula, the overall 
commitment of Turbay's government toward illegal drugs was strong. The military 
experience in "Operacion Fulminante," was very good, resulting in the United States asking 
for more military involvement. Despite the U.S. request, the Colombian government and 
military leaders gave priority to the guerrilla war and sent the troops back to fighting 
insurgency groups. Bagley identified six important insights that the military experience in 
the Guajira Campaign provided. First, the army's campaign did put a serious dent in the 
marijuana trade in the region, even though it did not halt it altogether. Second, the costs to 
the local population were high and deeply resented. The Guajira Peninsula is a region that 
is practically isolated from the central government's control. The region is very dry and 
facilities such as roads and airfields are rare. Because of this, a kind of "unofficial 
agreement" evolved, in which the government "accepted" contraband (not drug related) and 
other minor illicit activities.   The marijuana boom provided wealth to the region and 
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especially to growers, and since they were isolated and used to a lack of government 
intervention, the impact of "Operation Fulminante" against marijuana exerted a big 
economic and social impact on the population. Third, to the extent that enforcement efforts 
in the Guajira were successful, they tended merely to displace drug cultivation and transport 
activities to other parts of the country, rather than eliminating them. Fourth, the Colombian 
military was susceptible to drug corruption. Fifth, once the military withdrew, the traffickers 
proved to be quickly able to reestablish activities. Sixth, because supply-side eradication and 
interdiction campaigns were not coupled with parallel demand reduction programs, there was 
little (if any) hope of achieving a permanent cessation of drug trafficking. [Ref. 2, p. 80] 
Validating the last point, President Turbay noted: "Colombians are not corrupting 
Americans. You are corrupting us. If you abandon illegal drugs, the traffic will disappear."5 
From 1982 to 1986, the President was Belisario Betancur Cuartas, who began his 
government with reservations about the war on drugs, and refused on nationalistic grounds 
to honor the extradition treaty signed by his predecessor. Despite his "uncooperative" attitude 
towards Washington, Betancur did take measures against drug cartels. Anti-drug operations 
led by Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla were highly successful, leading drug dealers to 
put out a contract on Minister Lara. The Minister was assassinated on April 30,1984. 
Following the assassination of Minister Lara, the President proclaimed a "war 
without quarter" against the traffickers, and agreed to sign an extradition order for Carlos 
Lehder (a top drug dealer) to the United States. The actions taken by the government were 
strongly supported by the public, and results were impressive in all regards. Betancur's 
crackdown forced cartel leaders to leave the country. Some of them went to Panama where 
they paid strongman Manuel Noriega $4-5 million for protection. [Ref. 2, p.82] 
Of more devastating consequence to Colombia during this period were the escalating 
attacks on its judiciary system, as part of the traffickers' attack against extradition. Between 
1981 and 1986 over 50 judges, including a dozen Supreme Court Justices, were murdered. 
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Any judge handling a drug case was the target of death threats if he/she refused to be bribed.6 
This situation provided the basis for the new "faceless" judicial system, which was 
established to protect the integrity of the judges by keeping their identity a secret. 
President Virgilio Barco Vargas (1986-1990) promised to continue the fight against 
drug trafficking with the same level of commitment as his predecessor, but there is no 
evidence that during the first two years of his mandate, the anti-drug effort was any stronger 
than previously. 
One of the most important setbacks in the anti-narcotics efforts during this period 
occurred when the Supreme Court in early December 1986 declared the extradition treaty 
unconstitutional because it had not been signed by President Turbay himself but rather by the 
Minister of government.7 To fix the situation, President Barco signed the treaty to bring it 
back into effect. 
The level of anti-narcotics activities increased dramatically after the assassination of 
Guillermo Cano Isaza, a crusading anti-drug publisher of one of the biggest newspapers in 
Colombia. The assassination occurred just three days after the ratification of the extradition 
treaty by President Barco. In this offensive, good results were achieved especially in the 
middle leadership of the cartels; however no major cartel boss was captured. 
Following Barco's Presidency, Cesar Gaviria Trujillo (1990-1994) started a policy 
of "submission to justice" to drug traffickers, offering reductions of judicial penalties, while 
at the same time applying government pressure via security and intelligence forces. The 
initial results of this approach were good, leading to the surrender of drug lord Pablo Escobar 
Gaviria with the condition that he would not be extradited to the United States. But victory 
was far from permanent; several months later, Escobar escaped with the help of prison 
officials, apparently because he feared extradition. After the escape, the attitude of the 
government shifted dramatically, The government launched a frontal attack and started a 
6
 In the Colombian judiciary system, the judge is responsible for the verdict. There is no jury. 
7
 Under the provisions of the 1886 constitution, normally the Minister of Government assumes Presidential 






campaign to pay for information leading to the capture of cartel leaders. The submission 
option was still open, but the pressure was much more than before. 
With the desperate situation, due to the uncertainty created after Escobar's escape 
from jail, a "search block" was organized in Medellin to dismantle the cartel and capture its 
bosses. The search block was composed of elite units from the Army, Marines, Air Force, 
and the National Police. Impressive results were accomplished by the block: in less than a 
year and a half, the Medellin cartel was completely dismantled, and its principal boss, Pablo 
Escobar, killed. The prestige of the government increased and also the country gained 
international appreciation for its efforts. 
Another important aspect of the drug policy during the Gaviria's administration was 
the signing of the new Constitution (1991). For that purpose, a National Constituent 
Assembly (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente) was elected, where all political parties and 
interest groups were represented. The final product (the new Constitution), is more in line 
with reality and attempts to lead the country into the next century. With respect to drug 
issues, a major setback was included: the constitution does not allow extradition of 
Colombian citizens. This was considered by the United States as a step backwards in anti- 
narcotics efforts. 
Before entering the political arena, President Samper (1994-present) and other 
prominent Colombian economists favored legalization of marijuana. As President of the 
National Association of Financial Institutions (ANIF) in the late 1970s, he lead the 
movement toward legalization. In 1980, Samper [Ref. 8] said: 
... let us not forget, that the reality of marijuana in the United States is that 
they are smoking it in colleges, in factories, on buses, in parks, in homes. ... 
and this greater permissiveness is leading slowly but surely toward 
legalization of the consumption of marijuana. Therefore, we, in ANIF, 
recommend that legalization should be the result of a common joint effort 
between the two countries. We think it should be legalized simultaneously, 
on both sides, on grounds commonly agreed to. To think otherwise would not 
appear sensible. 
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He believed that the problem was essentially economic. Colombia's parallel economy 
was destabilizing and undermining its legitimate counterpart. This in turn was a threat to 
political stability and the nation's democratic traditions. 
During the 1994 presidential elections, a tape containing conversations regarding 
drug money to finance Samper's campaign was released by the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Agency (DEA) and the U.S. Embassy in Bogota, and given to the Colombian authorities for 
investigation. Although the veracity of the tape has not been proven, the situation generated 
political disputes and a sense of unrest in the whole country. 
Despite the tape and the alleged implications, Samper won the elections in a very 
close second round8 against conservative candidate Andres Pastrana Arango. His position 
during the campaign, even before the tape incident, favored the war on drugs. This change 
of mind with respect to what he believed in 1980 was used by his opponent during the 
campaign. Once again, as in 1978 with President Turbay, the United States took advantage 
of the situation and demanded in exchange for political support, "results" from the new 
government in the anti-drug campaign. 
Since his inauguration on the seventh of August 1994, President Ernesto Samper has 
maintained a strong position against the Cali cartels which replaced Medellin as the leading 
drug dealers. Although the President and other members of its Presidential campaign are 
being investigated for supposedly having received drug money in the campaign, their results 
in terms of capturing drug bosses are the best ever. In less than six months, the authorities 
put in jail seven of the eight Cali cartel leaders, including the two most important. Anti- 
narcotics efforts and a willingness to cooperate with the United States is strong, and looks 
to remain unchanged. 
In summary, the Colombian Policy on illegal drugs has been consistent in the sense 
that the commitment to attack the problem is present, but the level of pressure (commitment) 
shows a variation depending on two factors: first, the level and the kind of pressure that the 
United States applies to Colombia, and second, the internal security situation. Every time an 
In Colombia, a second round of votes is necessary if no one gets more than 50% of the votes in the first 
one. Only the first two candidates participate in the second round. 
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important person is assassinated, or the level of drug-related violence increases, the 




What is corruption? There are many perspectives from which corruption may be 
viewed or analyzed. Each perspective has its own set of questions and its own method of 
answering those questions. This chapter describes some of the most common definitions of 
corruption and viewpoints on corruption. This chapter will attempt to provide a working 
definition of corruption in the context of Colombia's anti-drug policy. 
A.       DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES AND DEFINITIONS 
James C. Scott [Ref. 10], believes that corruption involves a deviation from certain 
standards of behavior. The first question is, what criteria shall we use to establish those 
standards? In a broad way, he defines three criteria from which to choose: the public interest, 
public opinion, and the legal norms. Public interest and public opinion criteria pose great 
difficulties in their definitions. A standard of "public interest" would require an unambiguous 
definition of public interest so acts could be classified as to whether or not they serve the 
public interest. The problem is how to define public interest in a way that fits the points of 
view of all people concerned. Public opinion is another way to define the standards; this 
could be done by asking whether the public considers an act corrupt and then using the 
public's judgment as the definitional criterion. This approach will permit a differentiation 
of the corrupt acts, but the public's judgment would undoubtedly be divided or ambiguous 
on many issues. Then, the question becomes: should we take the majority's view, the 
consensus among the most powerful, the best opinion, or some other criteria? The first two 
alternatives will always lead to controversy and a difference of opinion. 
The third alternative is to rely heavily on legal norms in defining corruption. While 
this definition has shortcomings, it seems the most satisfactory alternative. Scott defines 
corruption as: 
Behavior which deviates from the normal duties of a public role (elective or 
appointive) because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private 
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clique) wealth or status gains: or violates rules against the exercise of certain 
types of private-regarding influence (Nye, 1967, p.416).9 
The initial part of the definition refers to the person in the transaction who occupies 
a public role or office, and the last part to the person acting in a private capacity. Corruption 
generally requires two parties. 
It is very important to frame the definition in such a way that no ambiguity exists on 
what is included and what is not. For example, says Scott, a powerful lobby's ability to 
secure passage of a law that greatly benefits its members does not in itself constitute 
corruption unless it can also be shown that the lobby bribed legislators or otherwise violated 
formal norms. 
Corruption may also be seen as one of the ways an individual can persuade someone 
who exercises public authority to act as he or she wants; in this perspective we can consider 
it as a kind of influence. We need to be careful here because many ways to influence or 
persuade individuals are legitimate; for example appealing to regulations or to equity issues. 
Scott [Ref. 10 p.21] states that influence is corrupt when, without the special consideration 
of kinship, bribery, or friendship, the public official would not have made the same decision. 
While most of the time this is true, there are cases where the public official decision could 
be influenced by having him understand reality (facts and situations); in this case, without 
that external influence he or she could never make the "right" decision. 
Other definitions of corruption included in the Internet Corruption Ranking page 
[Ref. 13] are: general definition: "corruption is the misuse of public power for private 
benefits" (senturia, 1931); legalistic definition: "a person is guilty of corruption who being... 
a public servant, accepts, or obtains, or agrees to accept, or attempts to obtain from any 
person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification whatsoever, other than legal 
enumeration, as a motive or reward for doing or forebearing to do any official act... or for 
rendering or attempting to render, any service or disservice to any person." (Indian Penal 
Code) 
9







In her book Corruption: A Study in Political Economy, [Ref. 14] Susan Rose- 
Ackerman says that there are at least seven types of interactions in which individuals try to 
influence the government. First, the relationship may be wholly legalistic. Individuals follow 
the rules as spelled out by the law without trying to obtain preference or change the rules, 
that is, they wait their turns, fill out forms, obey traffic signals, pay entrance fees, and supply 
goods at prices set by the government. Second, friendship, family ties, or personal loyalty can 
determine an agent's actions. Third, individuals might try to persuade or inform government 
officials. Fourth, citizens may work through the legal system by bringing lawsuits or seeking 
injunctions. Fifth, if the government is democratic, individuals could try to influence the 
outcome of the next election or sponsor referenda on important issues. Sixth, they could offer 
bribes. Finally, citizens may use threats to make officials do what they wish. 
Looking at those seven points, it is clear that some of them are not directly related to 
corruption; for example, a legalistic relationship or informing a government official does not 
constitute an act of corruption. The two more relevant are: offering bribes and threatening 
officials. Also, note that different kinds of interactions are not mutually exclusive, meaning 
that any combination of two or more is possible. 
Rose-Ackerman defines the interrelationships among voters, politicians, and interest 
groups. For this thesis, the model and characteristics of interest groups described by her [Ref. 
14], can be used with some modifications to explain how drug cartels (considered here the 
interest group) determine their political efficacy.10 An interest group must consider the 
benefits and the costs of attempting to change an official outcome. The study says that on one 
hand, the more competitive an industry, the more it "needs" government aid. On the other 
hand, organizing a well-financed group may be difficult in a more competitive industry. 
Illegal drug organizations operate in a very special environment, which to some extent can 
be considered an illegal monopoly. Because drug cartels are well organized and the industry 
is not very competitive, conceptually they don't need government help. The latter is also 
10
 For those interested in how the electorate's motives and information affect both legislative and interest 
group behavior, or on how legislative organization affects the actions of interest groups see Corruption: 






reinforced by the fact that being illegal places them out of any possible legal help from the 
government. But in reality these organizations need government help; at the highest level to 
change legislation on the criminal justice system, and at the lowest level to prevent arrest and 
drug seizures. These are the levels where corruption is found. Most studies on corruption 
concentrate on bribes as a way to influence the behavior of an official agent, but as we shall 
see, there are several other ways to influence an official agent. Taking this into consideration, 
it is important to recognize that the environment plays an important role in determining the 
kind of activity used. For example, an individual speeding on the highway might try to bribe 
the officer to avoid paying a higher fine; in the political arena, to get a nomination for public 
office, an individual is most likely to use family ties or a friendly relationship to influence 
the decision. 
Threats to exert influence deserve special treatment because people who are 
threatened are understandably willing to comply and most people would consider such 
compliance not necessarily corrupt. Threats themselves can be classified in three main 
groups: economic, of relationship, and physical. Which threats are corrupt and which are 
not? Take a situation for example, where countries or international organizations threaten 
other countries with the establishment of economic sanctions in exchange for political 
change. Shall we consider this an act of corruption by the threatening country, by the 
recipient country, or by both? The answer is very hard to frame because in this case there is 
no valid regulation nor consensus on what is right or wrong. Essentially, each party believes 
that its position is legitimate based on its own set of values and beliefs. These kinds of 
threats are not common within a country's political system, largely because individuals don't 
have the economic power to exert that kind of influence on their government. In a smaller 
perspective, an economic threat can be used by a boss to influence the behavior of a 
subordinate; for example, the supervisor can threaten his subordinates with lowering their 
pay grade. But in public agencies the culture is to follow directions. Therefore an economic 
threat is not a very common practice in that environment. 
A relationship threat introduces variables such as prestige, self esteem, and career 
progression. In this case the gains from an exchange are, on one side, the desired outcome 
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requested by the "threatening" person(s), and on the other, the approval and appreciation of 
the requesting person. This kind of threat is commonly used, and it is considered "corrupt" 
only when the official agent deviates from legitimate procedures and behavior. For example, 
a powerful politician, say, a senator, may use relationship threats to influence a low-rank 
police officer in minor incidents. 
The third group is physical threats. This kind of threat is not very common, nor 
considered as a particularly good way to influence public officials. Available research with 
some exceptions fails to address the impact and scope of such interaction. Physical threats 
will come as a consequence of unsuccessful attempts to influence individuals with traditional 
corrupt behaviors. This is the last tool that a corrupt person will use to obtain what he or she 
wants from the government. The issue of a physical threat incorporates a new ingredient in 
the scale of measures from which individuals are to be judged. Let's consider the following 
situations: 
• A policeman accepts money from a drug dealer to forego the inspection of a 
suitcase in the airport. 
• A second policeman receives a death threat to his family, and is asked to forego 
the inspection of a suitcase in the airport. 
Is there a difference between the two cases? Shall both policemen be treated equally? Are 
both corrupt to the same degree? Here there is another difficult situation, and again there is 
no exact definition to follow. If we look at the basic definition of corruption, both are equally 
guilty. But if we examine the human rationale, we may conclude that the second policeman 
has to some extent legitimate motives to accept the bribe. 
Throughout the range of perspectives and viewpoints regarding corruption, the 
following definition seems appropriate within this thesis. "Corruption is the misuse of public 
power for private benefits." Misuse means "out of the normal practices, regulations or law," 
and private benefits are those not considered as regular benefits inherent to the job. It is 
important to add that generally there are two parties involved, and an act is considered 
corrupt in the case of the offering party with the offering itself, and in the case of the 





definition, I would like to reemphasize the concept of a physical threat because it is 
particularly important in corruption caused by illegal drug trafficking. 
B.        CORRUPTION IN COLOMBIA 
This section describes how the definition of corruption developed in Section A fits 
corruption in Colombia, and how the war on drugs has affected corrupt practices. 
Drug cartels are very powerful organizations in Colombia; although they are not 
powerful in numbers, they are powerful in financial and logistics resources, weaponry, and 
extensive protection networks. Cocaine mafia organizations such as the Medellin and Cali 
cartels have penetrated into the decision making structures of Colombia such as legislatures 
and the public forces. Lee [Ref. 15] states that the size of a mafia operation requires the 
explicit coordination of many transactions as well as an information-gathering system and 
record keeping. Cartels are too big and too complex to escape detection, and they are also 
vulnerable to penetration by law enforcement agents. Because of this, they have to make 
large cash payments to official agents to protect their laboratories and smuggling routes and 
to keep their executives out of jail. Their protection system includes a well-organized 
intelligence network that extends to enforcement agencies. According to Lee it extends, 
perhaps, to U.S. embassies operating in drug producing countries. 
These organizations also have the capacity to perform violent acts, which are used 
as a threat to discipline their own people, and to influence government officials. This "war 
fighting" capability is being used to influence judicial outcomes with a practice called "your 
life or the money," meaning that the government official has two alternatives; take the money 
and do what they wish, or die. During the 1980s and 1990s this became a common practice 
against uncooperative judges, public officials, and newspaper writers. 
1. Practices and Tactics 
Cocaine traffickers use a combination of the carrot and stick to influence drug 
enforcement policies. [Ref. 15] Colombia mafias use coercive tactics against uncooperative 
officials or officials who publicly condemn their activities. The preferred method is to use 
financial means such as bribes, donations, and charitable activities to achieve their goals. 
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Money is the mafia's most important political weapon; it is used to build a public following 
among poorer classes, to buy protection from law enforcement officials, and to corrupt the 
political establishment. Violence, as stated in the previous section, is normally the last resort 
and is used only against officials who cannot be bought. 
a.        Pressure Tactics 
Mafia pressure tactics fall into two categories: blackmail and the threat or use 
of violence. In Colombia the cartels have used money and special campaign contributions 
as a wedge for later blackmail or defamation of an official. This practice is often used even 
if the official does not accept the bribe. They simply include the person in their payroll list 
and then release a copy to the authorities, thus putting the official's reputation at risk. A 
notorious case involved the Minister of Justice in the Betancur administration, Rodrigo Lara 
Bonilla, and a drug trafficker named Evaristo Porras. Lara was elected to the Senate in 1982 
and appointed to Betancur's cabinet in August 1983. As a Senator he led a congressional 
movement against drug money, and as Minister of Justice was very active against drug 
dealers, revealing in public for the first time, names of people involved and organization 
structures of the cartels. However, in the peak of his efforts, Lara was accused of being on 
the mafia payroll. His accuser was an Antioquian congressman with close ties to Pablo 
Escobar [Ref. 15], who presented a check that Porras had made out to Lara's name for one 
million pesos (about $14,000 U.S.) and a tape of a supposed conversation between Lara and 
Porras in Bogota. 
Lara's defense was that he had been set up; he said that the check never 
passed through his hands, that he never met Porras, and that the check was part of a 
transaction between Lara's company and one owned by Porras. The accuracy of such an 
accusation has never been proven. Nevertheless, the Minister continued in the cabinet as an 
active fighter against drugs until he was shot to death in April 1984. 
The other category is the threat or use of violence against government 
officials. The following description of infamous threats and violence in Colombia is based 
primarily on The White Labyrinth by Rensselaer W. Lee III. Although Lee states that many 
threats are linked to extradition cases, a contention that I don't fully agree with, such cases 
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were abundant in the 1980s, and should be considered in any study of corruption in 
Colombia. Most of the extradition requests by the United States to the Colombian 
government involve drug traffic and related offenses, and the narcotics lobby was until 1991 
clearly at the forefront of the national opposition to the extradition treaty.11 
The assassination of Minister Lara (1984) triggered a chain of actions that 
raised the level of confrontation between the drug cartels and the government. The 
government began to authorize extradition of drug traffickers to the United States, causing 
a series of death threats directed at Colombian law enforcers such as the Minister of Justice, 
Enrique Parejo, and against justices of the Colombia's Supreme Court. In some cases the 
messages were anonymous and did not give a reason for the threatened violence. Other 
massages were specific and terrifying. For example, an article published in El Espectador 
a well known daily newspaper in Bogota on March 3,1988 revealed a letter circulated by the 
Extraditables to several Supreme Court Justices in December 1986 which reads in part: 
We declare war against you. We declare war against all the members of your 
family. As you may suppose, we know exactly where they are- -we will do 
away with your entire family. We have no compassion whatsoever- -we are 
capable of anything, absolutely anything. We also have families. Botero [a 
pro-extradition Colombian Supreme Court Judge murdered early that year] 
had a family, too, wife, sons, parents, and brothers. He was a miserable 
government patsy and an anti-nationalist, pro-Yankee traitor to his country. 
[Ref. 15] 
The cocaine mafia also tries to dictate national rules on narcotics control. One 
of the most important political objectives of the mafia at the time was to force the 
government to adopt a policy of not extraditing Colombians to the United States. Moreover, 
the mafia seeks to paralyze the top echelons of the Colombia's criminal justice system and 
to discourage political crusaders against the cocaine industry. Where national drug policy is 
concerned, states Lee, violence rather than bribery has been the trafficker's main political 
weapon. 
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In July 1986, Hernan Baquero Borda, a Supreme Court Judge who helped 
draft the 1979 extradition treaty, was murdered by motorcyclists in Bogota. Also in July, 
Raul Echavarria, Deputy Director of the Cali daily El Occidente, was shot to death after 
writing an article advocating the death penalty for major traffickers. [Ref. 16] In October, a 
Medellin Superior Court Judge, Gustavo Zuluaga, was murdered and his wife wounded in 
Medellin. Zuluaga had issued an arrest warrant against Pablo Escobar and his cousin Gustavo 
Gaviria as the possible "intellectuaF'authors of the murder of two detectives who participated 
in Escobar's arrest for possession of cocaine in June 1976. The day after the arrest warrant 
was issued, four men intercepted Zuluaga's wife while she was driving near Medellin, forced 
her out, and then pushed the car over a cliff. "Next time, we'll make you stay with the car." 
[Ref. 17] 
In November 1986, Colonel Jaime Ramirez Gomez, a highly respected police 
officer and former head of Colombia's Anti-Narcotics Police, was killed in the vicinity of 
Bogota while he was returning from vacation. Ramirez was clearly a major thorn in the 
mafia's side. He was preparing to write a book revealing the results of many years of 
investigation into Colombia's cartels. He allegedly had evidence linking Pablo Escobar to 
the assassination of Minister Lara Bonilla. In December, the mafia disposed of another 
leading crusader against illegal drugs. Guillermo Cano, the editor and co-owner of the daily 
ElEspectador. Cano's signature appeared on several editorials advocating that Colombian 
drug traffickers be sent to the United States to stand trial. Violence and death threats were 
also carried out outside of Colombia; in early 1987 Enrique Parejo Gonzales, who had been 
Minister of Justice under Betancur's government was shot and severely wounded in 
Budapest. At the time he was the Colombian Ambassador to Hungary. Parejo had been an 
outspoken supporter of extradition and in his capacity as Minister of Justice approved several 
U.S. extradition requests by the United States. 
Another pressure tactic sometimes used is kidnaping. The kidnaping of 
Andres Pastrana, then a candidate for mayor of Bogota and a very prestigious politician, and 
the kidnaping-murder of Attorney General Carlos Mauro Hoyos in early 1988 are examples 





political statements against extradition. In the case of Pastrana, he was released with the 
condition that he personally deliver a message to the President regarding their anti- 
extradition demands. 
This "mar de sangre" (sea of blood) and intimidation has resulted in the loss 
of confidence in Colombia's political institutions. A national Colombian survey taken in 
March 1987 reported that nearly one-half of the population believed that drug traffickers 
were too powerful to combat. [Ref. 15] Moreover, as mentioned in Chapter II, the 
extradition process has been beaten. In June 1987, the Colombian Supreme Court nullified 
the legislation that enabled the government to implement the 1979 extradition treaty. 
Although the decision was based on the technical grounds that the actual President had not 
originally signed the enabling legislation, there are some reasons to believe that the mafia's 
record on murdering and threatening Supreme Court Justices contributed in some degree to 
the decision. In January 1988, appealing to a multinational convention that the United States 
and Colombia signed in Montevideo (Uruguay) in 1933, the government issued warrants for 
the arrest "with the attempt to extradite" of Pablo Escobar. However, the Council of State, 
Colombia's supreme administrative tribunal, declared the warrants invalid two months later. 
The wave of assassination and intimidation, at least those with political 
motivations against extradition, came to an end when the 1991 constitution finally forbade 
the extradition of Colombian citizens. Since then, the level of violent drug-related crimes 
against high level politicians and leading justice officials declined substantially. 
Previous examples were clearly aiming toward influencing drug policy issues 
using what Lee calls "veto by assassination." In addition to that practice, the mafia is also 
destroying the Colombian judicial system. Judges trying drug trafficking cases are offered 
death if they convict, or a bribe if they set aside charges. Not surprisingly, few judges opt to 
convict. During 1987 and 1988, criminal court judges released from jail or dropped charges 
against four major cocaine dealers: Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela, Jose Santacruz Londono, 
Evaristo Porras,and Jorge Luis Ochoa. [Ref. 15] The following statement by Richard Craig 
[Ref. 16 p.28] clearly reflects the situation that justice system officials and journalists faced 
in Colombia in the 1980s: 
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In their defense, many Colombian magistrates and politicians work under a 
double burden not borne by their U.S. counterparts- -extremely low salaries 
and the very real possibility, if not certainty, of physical elimination should 
they not "cooperate." When it comes to violence, Colombian traficantes 
stand out in a very violent country. They have raised the practice of 
intimidation to a shocking, totally unacceptable level. The results have been 
devastating in both human and political terms, leaving this observer to marvel 
at the courage of Colombian public officials and journalists. 
Other organizations like the police and security agencies had also been 
touched by threats to their members. A young police officer, whose name I would rather not 
give, once told me the following story: he was assigned as police inspector of a small 
"corregimiento"12 in a relatively "hot" drug area. The day of his arrival and after presenting 
himself to the civilian authorities and leaders of the small town where his office was located, 
he received a visit from two unknown individuals. They went directly to the bottom line: We 
don't want you to visit or send anybody to the surroundings of mi hacienda (ranch) on 
weekends; during the week there is no problem. In exchange we will pay you this amount 
monthly. Giving him no time to react, one of them said: by the way how is your wife? We 
know that she is doing okay in Bogota with your two little girls. Please send them our 
respects. What are the alternatives to this man? Should he accept the bribe? Or take the risk? 
In reality this is a no-win situation, because if he doesn't accept the bribe, his family might 
be in danger, and if he does accept the bribe, he will be in the trafficker's hands available for 
further favors, because if he rejects further bribes after receiving money once, they will turn 
him into higher authority. The last option for him could be to quit and tell his bosses that he 
won't work in that place. The last seems like a good personal solution but what will happen 
to the law enforcement system if everyone facing such choices resigns? The conclusion of 
this story is not relevant to this thesis, but the implications of such practices and the way a 
12
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human being reacts can help us understand to some extent the motivations that lead to 
corruption. 
b.        Bribery and Penetration 
This practice is most commonly used to establish an information network by 
having accomplices and informants inside law enforcement institutions, in key government 
ministries (such as Defense, Justice, and Foreign Relations), and in the media. It is also the 
basis for the development of operation networks throughout the world. Cocaine traffickers 
buy protection from the police, prosecutors, and, where necessary, the military. Time 
magazine [Ref. 18] reported in February 1985 that at least one hundred Colombian Air Force 
personnel and 200 National Policemen had been discharged because of their drug 
connections. Also 400 judges reportedly were under investigation by the Colombian Attorney 
General's office on alleged involvement in the drug trade. 
In April 1988, the intelligence officer of the Colombian Army's Fourth 
Brigade stationed in Medellin was dismissed because of proven contacts with the cartels. 
Medellin was the "drug center" in the 1980s and early 1990s. Although Army troops were 
not directly engaged in the anti-drug campaign, the Brigade Commander, an Army General, 
is the person responsible for the overall "public order" in the jurisdiction; therefore, he exerts 
operational command over all government forces such as the police and the administrative 
of the Department of Security in the area. This explains why the drug cartels tried to 
influence one of the most important staff members of the Brigade Commander. Similar cases 
were (are) spread out all over the country. Such extensive penetration of the state 
organizations is the way cartels protect their operations. They have also been able to develop 
an excellent warning system to avoid or anticipate raids on laboratories, police dragnets, and 
other operations against their industry. 
Bribes have been used when leading traffickers are arrested, on some 
occasions to buy their way out of custody on the spot, or to get out of jail. An example of the 
former happened when a car carrying Pablo Escobar was stopped at a police checkpoint near 
Medellin in November 1986. In that episode, Escobar managed to buy his freedom with a 
bribe of $250,000 to $350,000. (Officials held Escobar's wife, who was traveling with him, 
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until the money was paid). [Ref. 15] One of the most extraordinary cases of bribing an 
official to escape from jail occurred in the Modelo Prison in Bogota. Juan Manual Mata 
Ballesteros, one of Latin America's most notorious drug traffickers, escaped from prison by 
paying a large bribe to 18 guards. Matta was given the key to his own cell and walked 
through seven unlocked jail doors to freedom. "God opened the doors for me," the trafficker 
commented after the escape. [Ref. 17] 
This kind of bribery is still very common in Colombia. Low salaries in law 
enforcement agencies, even after good adjustments made in the government of President 
Cesar Gaviria Trujillo (1990-1994), encourage bribery, and the "culture" has developed over 
the years regarding "dinero facil" (easy money). 
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IV. DATA COLLECTION AND UTILIZATION 
This chapter explains the information used to conduct the analysis. It also describes 
how that information was collected and how it is used to establish the relationship between 
the action against illegal drugs and the level of official corruption in Colombia. The chapter 
is in three sections: Colombia's Department of Defense budget, the anti-drug action curve, 
and measuring corruption. The section on Colombia's defense budget includes information 
about the overall budget, the participation of the police and the military forces in the total 
amount, and the defense budget as a percentage of the national budget. Section B describes 
the development of the "anti-drug" action curve, which is the result of a combination of the 
Colombian defense budget from 1985 to 1995 and the level of commitment (motivation and 
policy) of each government during special events related to illicit drug activities. Section C 
explains the information collected to measure corruption. The analysis is based on the 
number of articles related to Colombia, illegal drugs, and corruption published by 
Colombia's newspaper EL TIEMPO and by THE ECONOMIST magazine. The main 
objective of this chapter is to organize the available data in a way that allows us to perform 
the desired analysis. 
A.        COLOMBIA'S MINISTRY OF DEFENSE BUDGET 
Before going through the Ministry of Defense budget, it is important to understand 
its basic organization, and how its mission is related to the war on illegal drugs. 
1.        Mission and Organization 
The ministry of Defense mission is: advise the Colombian President about policy for 
the Public Force direction and execute policies in order to preserve the national sovereignty. 
Why is the Defense ministry engaged in illegal drug actions? The answer is simple. If the 
President or the Congress establish drug trafficking as a national security issue, which is 
currently the case, then it becomes a task for the Defense ministry. Also, because the national 
Police is under the Defense Ministry organization, (See Figure 1) and its mission is to 
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preserve the public order, the burden of the Defense Ministry in internal matters is even 
larger. 
The concept of a Defense Ministry highly involved in internal matters differs from 
the traditional role of similar organizations in most countries. This situation can be explained 
because in Colombia the main concern is the internal situation. The government faces two 












ARMY NAVY AIR FORCE NATIONAL POLICE 
Figure 1. Defense Ministry Organization 
Regarding external security, the military forces are small but capable of exerting a 
limited dissuasion effect to probable aggressors. The relationship with neighboring countries 
is good. The only problems are minor border disputes with Venezuela and Nicaragua which 
are being addressed in diplomatic terms. The Police in Colombia is in charge of the war on 
drugs; the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force provide support and are engaged in large 
operations. The Police is national, meaning that all policemen fall under the same 
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2. Defense Budget 
The Defense budget is signed by the President and authorized by Congress. The total 
budget for the public force for 1995 was 1,812,269 millions of pesos (some U.S. $2,015 
million), divided among the following agencies and/or groups : Defense Minister staff, 
General Command (similar to the U.S. Joint Chief of Staff), Army, Navy, Air Force, Satena 
(government air service to national territories13), Military University, Police Commissioner, 
which was created in 1993 to control and supervise violation of human rights and abuses by 
the police, and the National Police. Table 2 shows the distribution of the budget among these 
agencies in 1994 and 1995. Note that the Police receives almost half of the total amount. The 
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force have also a big share. 
AGENCY 1994 1995 
Ministry staff 149,858 204,591 
General Command 10,506 18,810 
Army 386,375 502,096 
Navy 102,226 138,564 
Air Force 10,796 155,939 
Satena 1,600 1,963 
Military University 2,524 4,317 
Superintendent. Int. 1,691 2,647 
Police Commissioner 7,104 
Police 530,626 776,238 
Total 1,296,201 1,812,269 
Table 2. Defense Budget by Agencies, 1994 and 1995 (Millions of Pesos) 
Table 3 is a summary of the Defense budget from 1985 to 1995 divided by functional 
areas such as personnel services, general expenditures, transfers, and investment. It also 
13 National territories (territorios nacionales) are parts of the country with access difficulties. The government 
air service helps growers and rural people to move goods to markets. 
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1985 48,904 13,040 24,561 15,897 102,402 696,612 14.70% 
1986 65,300 11,940 30,319 24,627 132,186 976,263 13.54% 
1987 85,674 19,216 39,622 30,675 175,187 1,246,882 14.05% 
1988 114,408 28,924 50,935 57.084 251,351 1,688,052 14.89% 
1989 148,498 31,015 59,698 86.451 325,662 2,290,169 14.22% 
1990 195,199 41,861 29,841 100,238 367,139 3,132,585 11.72% 
1991 252,602 83,905 61,269 70.155 467,931 4,369,104 10.71% 
1992 363,497 132,012 84,349 121,879 701,737 5,118,432 13.71% 
1993 514,492 256,903 120,733 212,164 1,104,292 6,696,737 16.49% 
1994 744,539 252,231 188,300 111,131 1,296,201 10,110,772 12.82% 
1995 997,122 302,937 341,988 170,222 1,812,269 12,591,667 14.39% 
Source: La Fuerza Put 
bulletin No. 2, April 19 
>lica en Cifras, (The Public Force in Numbers), Colombian Defense Ministry, 
95. (Figures are not adjusted for inflation) 
Table 3. Defense Budget, 1985-1995 (Millions of Pesos) 
To establish the pattern of the budget from 1985 to 1995, it is necessary to adjust it 
for inflation. Table 4 contains the overall Defense and the National Police budget adjusted 
to 1995 Colombian pesos. The table also includes both budgets as a percentage of the total 
National budget. Figure 2 is the defense budget from 1985 to 1995 adjusted for inflation. 
Figure 3 is the police budget from 1985 to 1995 adjusted for inflation. 
Since the National Police is the organization with the highest burden both in the 
defense budget and in the action against illegal drugs, its budget in real 1995 Colombian 
pesos will give a good measure of the evolution and trend of the resources devoted to reduce 
the drug trafficking problem. 
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includes the total national budget and the defense expenditures as a percent of the total 
budget. 
E R Personnel General Transfers Investment TOTAL National Percentage 
Services Expendit. BUDGET Budget N. Budget 
1985 48,904 13,040 24,561 15,897 102,402 696,612 14.70% 
1986 65,300 11,940 30,319 24,627 132,186 976,263 13.54  
1987 85,674 19,216 39,622 30,675 175,187 1,246,882 14.05  
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1985 944,556.50 14.70% 407,608.70 6.34% 
1986 995,334.00 13.54% 407,505.20 5.54% 
1987 1,090,184.00 14.05% 465,074.00 5.99% 
1988 1,261,412.00 14.89% 482,867.70 5.70% 
1989 1,275,834.00 14.22% 491,196.70 5.47% 
1990 1,140,624.00 11.72% 408,710.90 4.20% 
1991 1,098,009.00 10.71% 427,667.20 4.17% 
1992 1,298,612.00 13.71% 500,478.50 5.28% 
1993 1,633,155.00 16.49% 597,529.30 6.03% 
1994 1,563,089.00 12.82% 639,881.90 5.25% 
1995 1,812,269.00 14.39% 776,238.00 6.16% 
Source: La Fuerza Publica en Cifras, (The Public Force in Numbers), Colombian Defense Ministry, 
bulletin No. 2, April 1995. (Figures are adjusted for inflation) 
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B.       THE ANTI-DRUG ACTION CURVE 
Section B of Chapter II describes the main shifts of the Colombian anti-drug policy, 
and the reasons for each change. The main points of change were two: first, budget allocation 
and second, the level of commitment of the governments to take action against drug 
trafficker organizations and against the illegal trade itself. To measure the real efforts against 
illegal drug trafficking, it is necessary to develop an "anti-drug" action curve that captures 
both budget and commitment. The budget, explained in Section A of this chapter, is an easy 
measure that can be found in official records. The level of commitment is a subjective 
measure that can be derived from important policy actions and national events. From 1985 
to 1995, the level of commitment can be divided into four categories: low, medium, high, 
and very high. Each level contributed in different percentages to the overall "anti-drug 
action" curve over the years. Those different levels are summarized in the commitment level 
curve. See Figure 4 and Table 5. 
The "anti-drug" action curve developed in this thesis is an attempt to capture the real 
commitment of the Colombian government to fight the war on drugs in the selected period 
of time. Most of the research in this area concentrates on budget, and establishes a level of 
commitment by the amount of money expended in such actions. While this is a real measure, 
most of the times it fails to explain the behavior and real motives that countries like 
Colombia have to increase or reduce their efforts. To understand this concept, let's take the 
example of a soccer team: during the first half, the team has no concentration and everything 
seems to be not working at all. The other team starts screaming "you look ridiculous, you 
should be playing in a less competitive league," and other similar things; suddenly the team 
starts playing better, regains concentration and realizes that they were capable of beating the 
other team. In this case their self-esteem and their motivation was enhanced by a specific 
situation. Note that the money invested in their training and equipment didn't change, but 
their performance did. To develop a curve that closely represents the real anti-drug action, 
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it is necessary to combine the budget figures with the commitment curve. The following 
subsections describe those curves. 
1.        Commitment Level Curve 
The level of motivation and commitment has an important impact in the overall 
action against illegal drugs. The government has a plan, and devotes resources to accomplish 
it, but there are events that trigger the real commitment against illegal drug trafficking and 
boost the motivation of law enforcement agencies to act effectively. 
DATE EVENT LEVEL % 
April 1984 Assassination of Justice Minister Rodrigo 
Lara Bonilla. President Betancur declared 
"war without quarter" against drug dealers. 
High 30 
August 1986 President Virgilio Barco took office. Medium 20 
Dec. 1987 President Barco declared "state of siege"in 
response to violence. 
High 30 
August 1989 Assassination of Presidential candidate Luis 
Carlos Galan and other three candidates. 
Very High 50 
August 1990 President Cesar Gaviria took office and 
started a submission to justice policy to drug 
traffickers, offering reductions of judicial 
penalties if they turned in voluntarily. 
Medium 20 
Dec. 1991 New Constitution is signed. Medium 20 
July 1992 Drug dealer Pablo Escobar escaped from 
jail. 
Very High 50 
Dec. 1993 The Police killed drug dealer Pablo Escobar. Medium 20 
August 1994 President Ernesto Samper took office and 
started a frontal attack against illegal drugs. 
Very High 50 
Table 5. Summary of the Commitment Curve 
Based on observation and noting the effect that particular events exerted in the level 
of commitment and motivation to act against drugs, a good approximation is to assign the 





• Low level        10% 
• Medium level  20% 
• High level       30% 
• Very High        50% 
These percentages are to be applied to the budget figures in the corresponding time 
frames in order to obtain the "anti-drug" action curve. For example, if the National Police 
budget for 1995 is 776,238 pesos, and the level of commitment is very high, the associated 
value on the "anti-drug" action curve will be 776,238X0.5 units of action. 
The main events and policy actions used to construct the commitment curve are 
summarized in Table 5. For details see Colombian Drug Policy in Section B Chapter II. 
2. Budget Curve 
As stated before, of all the budget figures described in the previous section, the 
National Police budget in real pesos is the one that represents more accurately the amount 
of resources devoted to reducing illicit drug activities. Since the figures are in real pesos, 
they capture the different levels of effort (assuming that the effort is directly related to the 
budget) of the government against illegal drug trafficking. Of course there are many other 
variables such as the Department of Justice budget and the military and many other agencies 
involved in the general effort, but since the Police has the highest burden, both, in the anti- 
drug action and in the anti-drug budget, it is the one used in this analysis. This curve is the 
second component of the "anti-drug" action curve. (Figure 5) 
To obtain the final "anti-drug" action curve we multiply the values of the National 
Police budget in real pesos times the different levels of commitment described in the 
commitment curve. This curve represents the Colombian Government level of effort against 
illegal drugs and will be treated as the independent variable to identify the relationship 
between the effort and the level of official corruption in Colombia. Section C explains how 
corruption is measured in the context of this paper, and the sources of information. 
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Figure 4. National Police Budget Curve as a Percentage of National Budget 
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C.       MEASURING CORRUPTION 
Measuring corruption is not an easy task. Some of the most common ways to measure 
corruption are: the number of officials convicted on corruption charges; illegal enrichment 
by government officials; impact of political campaign contributions by interest groups or 
individuals; and surveys. All are valid and somehow the result of common sense thinking. 
Unfortunately, corruption is a very complex behavior that cannot be explained with a single 
method or variable; therefore, I must make clear that the present research is only a small step 
in the long road to understand the scope and depth of the problem. Going back to the 
different methods, if we measure the level of corruption as a direct function of the number 
of officials convicted, what if the law enforcement agencies are doing a better job? In this 
case, more corrupt officials will be convicted but not because of an increase in corrupt 
practices. The number will increase because law enforcement agencies will arrest more 
people as a consequence of better techniques, more resources, and training. Also if law 
enforcement institutions are corrupt themselves, how could you be assured that the measured 
level of corruption is accurate? Finding the weaknesses of each approach could be endless 
due to the many factors involved in the problem. The important point is to recognize that 
there is no such perfect unit of measure of corruption, and that every small step in the right 
direction will contribute positively in the overall effort to develop a model that helps people 
understand the phenomena. 
To represent the level and trend of official corruption in Colombia, a social research 
technique is used. The data is the number of articles related to official corruption published 
by two important publications. The purpose is to capture the general sense that society has 
regarding the problem and to use this sense as a proxy for the size of the problem . The 
number of articles represent general perception of an issue because credible newspapers and 
magazines attempt to inform the public on general interest aspects. For example, if there is 
a terrorist group exploding bombs in malls and supermarkets, most likely local and national 
newspapers and magazines will include articles regarding the terrorist actions. In the same 
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fashion, if the level of corruption is high (i.e. judges being bribed), the media will inform 
people, and will also conduct their own investigations to unveil corruption problems. As 
stated before, this is by no means a perfect approach, but the logic behind it is good and will 
provide a new perspective to look at the problem. 
The two sources of information are: the Colombian newspaper El Tiempo, and the 
magazine The Economist. Both are prestigious publications with no apparent bias regarding 
illegal drug trafficking or corruption in Colombia. 
1. Colombia's Newspaper El Tiempo 
El Tiempo was selected for two reasons: first, it is the most prestigious daily 
newspaper in Colombia, and second, because even with liberal14 ideas, the editorial board 
has maintained a high level of impartiality regarding political issues. 
The data was collected in Bogota by Mrs Claudia Beltran during September 1995, 
and includes all the articles published by the newspaper regarding official corruption 
between August 1990 and August 1995. The list of the articles with date, headline, and page 
is included in Appendix A. Table 6 contain the number of articles by month. This data is 
used as the dependent variable in the analysis chapter, in an attempt, as mentioned before, 
to establish if there is a relationship between the "anti-drug" action curve and this measure 
of corruption. 
2. The Economist 
The Economist was selected because of its world wide prestige, and the sense that 
when The Economist publishes something, something is really happening, especially when 
it publishes an article on countries like Colombia. The data from The Economist was 
collected with the help of the electronic resources section in the Dudley Knox Library at the 
Naval Postgraduate School, and includes all articles published by that magazine regarding 
Colombia, and related to official corruption since January 1985. This data is used also as a 
14
 The liberal party is the biggest political party in Colombia. The last three Presidents have been liberals, and 
the newspaper supports that ideology. The Liberal party was officially established in 1850. The main ideas 
were a lessened executive power; separation of church and state; freedom of press, education, religion, and 





dependent variable in the analysis with the additional purpose to establish if there is a 
relationship to the newspaper El Tiempo in terms of trend. Table 7 contains the number of 
articles published by this magazine. 
YEAR 
MONTH 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
January 0 5 9 5 10 
February 3 7 3 4 9 
March 7 8 9 5 9 
April 8 3 10 7 11 
May 6 8 8 5 11 
June 6 7 9 3 12 
July 5 6 10 10 13 
August 2 4 9 19 11 9 
September 10 11 9 5 3 
October 3 7 11 6 10 
November 9 4 12 7 5 
December 3 1 8 8 8 
Total 27 62 93 103 76 84 
Table 6. Number of Articles on Corruption of Colombian Government Officials 
Published by El Tiempo (1990-1995) 
D.        SUMMARY 
In summary, from the information described in this chapter, the following sets of 
data (three) are used in the analysis: the "anti-drug" action curve, which is a combination 
of the Colombian National Police budget in real pesos, and the commitment level curve 
described in Section B of this chapter; the number of articles regarding official corruption 







the number of articles on the same topic published by The Economist magazine from 
January 1985 to September 1995. The following chapter (analysis), explains how the 
information is used, the sequence of the analysis, and the results. 
YEAR 
MONTH 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
January 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 3 
February 1 1 1 2 
March 1 2 2 1 
April 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 
May 1 1 2 1 2 3 
June 1 1 1 1 1 4 
July 2 1 1 1 
August 2 3 1 1 1 1 2 6 
September 1 12 1 1 1 
October 1 2 2 2 
November 1 1 2 2 
December 1 2 2 2 1 
Total 4 2 6 14 22 13 7 6 11 5 21 
Table 7. Number of Articles on Corruption of Colombian Government Officials 
Published by Economist (1985-1995) 
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V. DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
This chapter explains the sequence and the methodology used in the analysis of the 
data presented in Chapter IV. It also contains a section with statistical definitions and 
concepts, the results of the analysis, and their interpretation in an attempt to answer the basic 
research question of the thesis: is there a relationship between the war on drugs and official 
corruption in Colombia? The data analysis is conducted in the following sequence: 
• Compare the information on the number of articles published by El Tiempo and 
by The Economist to find if they are correlated. In Chapter IV the data from El 
Tiempo is from 1990 to 1995, and the data from The Economist is from 1985 to 
1995. If in fact there is a correlation then, the measure of the level of corruption 
using The Economist could be used for the ten-year period. 
• Run a regression using the number of articles published by El Tiempo (level of 
corruption) as the dependent variable against the "anti-drug" action curve 
developed in the previous chapter and analyze the results. 
• Run a regression using the number of articles published by The Economist (level 
of corruption) as the dependent variable against the "anti-drug" action curve and 
analyze the results. 
• Compare and interpret the results. 
Before going through the analysis section, it is important to clarify some statistical 
definitions and concepts used in the analysis. Section A includes important definitions and 
a review of the statistical concepts used in the analysis. 
A.        STATISTICAL CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS 
This section discusses the fundamental concepts and elements of regression analysis 
used in the analysis of the corruption data. This section is not an attempt to provide detailed 
information about the topic of regression analysis, but to clarify important concepts and 
definitions to help non-statistical-oriented readers to understand the terminology and 
concepts used in Section B. This section is divided in four parts: definition of a regression 







Concepts and definitions are from an unpublished manuscript by Professor Shu S. Liao. [Ref. 
20] 
1.        Regression Model 
Regression is a technique of quantifying relationships between two or more variables. 
It is concerned with the problem of explaining or estimating the value of one variable, 
generally called the dependent variable (7), on the basis of one or more other variables (X), 
called explanatory or independent variables. Regression is one of the most widely used 
quantitative techniques in business and governmental organizations because of the many 
issues faced by managers involving the extent of one variable's relationship to another. 
Another common application for regression is to explain the effect of a government policy 
on a society, which is the case outlined in this thesis. Our model will attempt to explain the 
relationship between the war on drugs (government actions) and the level of official 
corruption in Colombia. For this case, the regression model will reveal how these variables 
are correlated, and the true effect or impact of government action on the level of official 
corruption. The general form of a simple regression equation is: 
Yc=a+bX (1) 
Where Yc represents the estimated amount for the dependent variable and X is the 
value of the independent variable. The coefficients a and b represent the constant and the 
slope of the curve respectively. 
Regression models are built from a well-defined set of assumptions. First, the 
dependent variable is linearly related to the explanatory variable. Second, the error terms of 
a properly conducted regression analysis should be normally distributed. Third, the error 
terms are assumed to have a finite variance; that is constant for all given values of the 
independent variable (homoscedasticity). Fourth, the error terms are assumed to have a mean 







2.        Measures of Goodness of Fit 
Since a regression equation represents the average relationship between the 
dependent variable and the independent variable, in most models random deviations are 
inevitable. It is rather unlikely that the "best-fitting" straight line will go through all points 
observed. In reality, most of the observations will lie above or below the regression line. The 
goal of the least squares method15 is to find the "best-fitting" line that passes close to all the 
data points. The most commonly used measures of goodness of fit are the standard error of 
estimate, the coefficient of correlation, and the coefficient of determination. 
a. Standard Error of Estimate 
The standard error of the estimate is computed similarly to the standard 
deviation in descriptive statistics. The standard error is a measurement of the typical vertical 
distance from the sample data points to the regression line. If the error terms are normally 
distributed around the regression line, the standard error of estimate can be used to examine 
the dispersion of data points around the regression line and assess the goodness of fit of the 
model. 
The value of Se may be interpreted like the sample standard deviation in a 
normal distribution, i.e., given that the assumptions of regression hold, approximately 68 
percent of the observed values will fall within 1.0 Se of the regression line. 90 percent will 
fall within 1.64 Se of the line, and 95 percent will fall within 2.0 Se of the line. This measure 
is particularly useful to managers in the selection of data points outside of a desired range. 
b. Coefficient of Correlation 
Another measure of the goodness of fit of a regression model is the 
coefficient of correlation, which provides a relative measure of the relationship between the 
dependent and the independent variable. If there is a perfect relationship between the 
dependent variable and the independent variable, no error term exists, the standard error of 
the estimate would be zero (Se = 0), and the coefficient of correlation will be one. The 
15
 The least squares method is used to locate the regression line. It determines the values of a and b so that 
the sum of the squared deviations between the observations and the fitted line is less than that from any 






coefficient of correlation is always between zero and one and is calculated as the squared 
root of one minus the ratio of standard error of estimate squared over the standard error of 
the dependent variable squared. 
R 
\ 
<?2 1A (2) 
S2 y 
In summary, the coefficient of correlation measures the degree of dispersion. A low 
coefficient of correlation means high dispersion. The coefficient is represented by the letter 
R. 
c. Coefficient of Determination 
Although the coefficient of correlation is a good measure of the goodness of 
fit of the regression line, its value is not intuitively meaningful. The coefficient of 
determination R 2 provides more meaning. R2 or the coefficient of determination is very 
easy to interpret. For example, if R = 0.8, R2 = 0.64, which means that 64 percent of the 
sample variation from the mean of the dependent variable can be explained by the change 
in the independent variable in the regression equation in question. This interpretation can be 
explained algebraically but since this is not intended to be a statistical text, those proofs are 
not included. Interested readers are encouraged to consult statistical textbooks or Ref. 20 of 
this thesis. 
3. Statistical Significance of the Regression Line 
The statistical significance of a regression line is used to determine whether 
knowledge of the independent variable X is really useful in predicting the values of the 
dependent variable Y. For this analysis, the coefficient b (slope) of the regression equation 
is of primary interest. For example, if there is no relationship between the independent and 
dependent variable, the slope of the true regression line would be zero, i.e., the true 
regression line must be a horizontal straight line and the predicted value of the dependent 
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variable Yc is equal to the mean of the sample values. Since Yc is a constant for any value 
of X whenever the slope of the line is not significantly different from zero, the values of X 
are of no use in predicting the values of Y. Conversely, if the slope is significantly different 
from zero, then the values of X are meaningful in predicting the values of Y. The "t-test" and 
"f-test" are the most commonly methods used to evaluate the statistical significance of the 
regression equation. 
a. T-test 
The t-test is used to determine if the value of a slope, b, is significantly 
different from zero. To do this, it is necessary to determine the standard error of the b 
coefficient. The "t-ratio" then, is defined as the value of the slope b divided by its standard 
error. This statistic is sometimes referred to as the number of standard errors of the 
regression coefficient. [Ref. 20] For example, a t-ratio of five indicates that the value of the 
slope in the regression is five standard errors from zero. 
Since the aim of this method is to determine if the slope, b, is significantly different 
from zero, the higher the t-value, the more unlikely that the b coefficient is a random 
variation from zero. In other words, a high t-value indicates that the independent variable is 
important in explaining the value of the dependent variable. Generally, t-values greater than 
2.0 are desired except when the sample size is small. [Ref. 20] 
The statistical significance of the constant term a is also verified with a t-ratio, 
and its interpretation is similar to that of the coefficient b. All t-values are followed by a p- 
value which represents the probability of error. 
b. F-test 
According to S. Liao [Ref. 20], the f-test is another way of testing the null 
hypothesis that the slope of the true regression line is equal to zero (i.e., b is simply a random 
deviation from 0). This test uses the measures of unexplained and explained variation. The 
total variation in Y equals the sum of explained variation and unexplained variation. In 
general terms, the f-value is calculated by dividing the mean squares16 of the regression by 
16














the mean squares of the error. This value is equivalent to the t-ratio squared when there is 
only one independent variable in the model. 
The most significant use of the f-test in regression analysis is to check the 
statistical significance of R2. For example, if we have an R2 of 95%, the statistical 
significance of the model is not a question. But in real life situations results like that are rare. 
In a real case, the f-test plays an important role. As in the t-test, the higher the f-ratio, the 
more unlikely that the b coefficient is a random deviation from zero. As mentioned earlier, R2 
represents the proportion of total variation in Y that is explained by the regression equation. 
Therefore, it is very important to know its statistical significance. 
4.        Residual Analysis 
The error terms represent the difference between the actual or observed values of the 
dependent variable Y, and its projected values Yc. Residual terms analysis is a powerful tool 
to check the validity of the regression model. One of the easiest ways to analyze the residuals 
is plotting them in different ways. The most common plots are: The normal probability plot, 
the residual (e) vs. Fit (Yc) plot, the time series plot, and the residual vs. explanatory variable 
plot. Following is a brief description of the characteristics of each one, and how they are 
used. 
a. Normal Probability Plot 
In this case, we plot the error terms against the equivalent normal scores. 
Since the distribution of the error terms in a good regression model is expected to be random 
or close to random (no apparent pattern out of consideration), this plot's desired shape is a 
45 % straight line. The straightness of the normal probability distribution of the error terms 
can be measured by the coefficient of correlation R. 
b. Residual vs Fit Plot 
This plot allows us to find violations to the homoscedasticity and linearity 
assumptions. The residual vs. fit plot removes the effect of the regression line and amplifies 
any existing pattern in the error terms. If we find no pattern, this means that the two 
assumptions are being met. Conversely, if a pattern is obvious in the plot, the regression 
model is missing an important variable or the variable is not in the appropriate form. 
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c. Time Series Plot 
In this plot, the observations are plotted in sequence. This plot will have 
meaning only when the data is collected or can be arranged in a manner involving time. It 
is intended to show how consecutive data points relate to each other. 
d. Residual vs. Explanatory Variable Plot 
The purpose of this plot is to see if a curvilinear relationship exists between 
the residuals and any particular explanatory variable. The correct sequence is to look at the 
residual vs. Fit plot; if there is no curvilinear pattern in that plot, there is no need to conduct 
the plot against the explanatory variables. On the other hand, if there is such pattern, the 
correct step is to plot the residuals against all explanatory variables to find the one that is 
causing the problem. 
In addition to the residual analysis techniques and the other measures to 
evaluate the significance of a regression model, is important to mention the lack-of-fit and 
the Durbin-Watson tests. The lack-of-fit test uses the F-statistic. If the F is insignificant, this 
means that the relationship between the dependent variable and the explanatory variable is 
linear. Otherwise, the relationship is curvilinear. The Durbin-Watson test is a summary 
measure of the serial correlation in the error terms. With uncorrelated errors, the Durbin- 
Watson statistic has values close to two. If the errors are perfectly and positively correlated, 
the value will be zero, and for perfectly negatively correlated errors the value is four. [Ref. 
20] 
B.        DATA ANALYSIS 
The statistical analysis is conducted using the MINITAB software package available 
in the Systems Management Department computer laboratory. 
1. Relationship Between El Tiempo and The Economist 
To find out if there is a significant relationship between the number of articles 
published by the newspaper El Tiempo and The Economist magazine it is necessary to use 





The regression output using The Economist data as the dependent variable, and El 
Tiempo as the independent variable also produced very poor results. LEVEL1 is the level of 
corruption measured by the number of articles published by El Tiempo, and LEVEL2 refers 
to the level of corruption using The Economist data. 
The regression equation is: 
LEVEL2  =0.158  + 0.0997 LEVEL1. (3) 
Predictor Coefficient Standard Deviation t-ratio P 
Constant 0.1579 0.3379 0.47 0.642 
LEVEL! 0.09970 0.04211 2.37 0.021 
s= 1.100 R2 = 8.7% #-'(adj) = 7.1% 
Analysis of Variance: 
Source DF SS MS F P 
Regression 1 6.786 6.786 5.61 0.021 
Error 59 71.410 1.210 
Total 60 78.197 
Unusual Observations: 
Observation LEVEL1 LEVEL2 Fit Standard 
Deviation 
Fit 
Residual St. Residual 
37 19.0 2.000 2.052 0.513 -0.052 -0.05x 
59 12.0 4.000 1.354 0.243 2.646 2.47R 
61 9.0 6.000 1.055 0.158 4.945 4.54R 
Rdenotes an observation with a large standard residual. 
x
 denotes an observation whose X value gives it large influence. 
From the results, we can say that the two levels are not highly correlated. Although 
the t-ratio for LEVEL1 is not that bad, the R2 is only 8.7 percent, indicating that their level 
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of correlation is very low. This result may be useful in some cases depending on the specific 
use, but in this case that is not true; the purpose was to use LEVEL2 (corruption using The 
Economist) to replace LEVEL1 (corruption using El Tiempo) in the ten-year analysis. The 
lack of correlation between these two sets of data can be explained by two factors. First, the 
number of articles published by The Economist is very low, having a large number of zeros 
if we use months as a time frame. (Months is the time base for the data in the newspaper El 
Tiempo) These zeros generate errors in the mathematical computations used to conduct the 
regression, thus making it difficult to find the relationship. Second, The Economist is a 
worldwide publication that places its emphasis on industrialized countries and events of 
world interest. Colombia is a small country in the international context, and even though 
illegal drug trafficking is considered as a priority in these times, is difficult to relate the level 
of official corruption in Colombia with the number of articles published by that world 
magazine. 
2. Relationship Between El Tiempo and the Anti-Drug Action Curve 
The first step is to define the dependent and the independent variables; then run a 
simple linear regression between the two to establish their relationship. Since the purpose 
is to see if the war on drugs, represented here with the anti-drug action curve, has had some 
impact on the level of official corruption in Colombia, the logic calls for us to use the "anti- 
drug" action curve as the independent variable and the level of corruption as the dependent 
variable (LEVELJ). Figure 6 is the plot of the two variables. 
The regression equation is: 
LEVEL1  = 4.07  + 0.000015 ACCION1. (4) 
Predictor Coefficient Standard Deviation t-ratio P 
Constant 4.0695 0.7643 5.32 0.000 
ACCION1 0.00001547 0.00000321 4.82 0.000 
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Figure 6. Plot of the Two Variables {LEVEL1 Vs. ACCION1) 
Analysis of Variance: 
Source DF SS MS F P 
Regression 1 192.80 192.80 23.22 0.000 
Error 59 489.89 8.30 
Total 60 682.69 
The t-ratios for the constant (5.32) and for the explanatory variable ACCION1 (4.82) 
are significant. Generally, t-values greater than 2.0 are desired. The high t-ratio value for the 
independent variable ACCION1 indicates that the variable (action curve in this case) is 
important in explaining the value of the level of corruption (LEVEL1). The high t-ratio for 
the constant also indicates that the constant term is important for explaining the relationship. 
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31 298765 3.000 8.690 0.469 -5.690 -2.00R 
37 298765 19.000 8.690 0.469 10.310 3.63R 
50 319941 3.000 9.017 0.514 -6.017 -2.12R 
R
 denotes an observation whose X value gives it large influence. 
Durbin-Watson statistic = 2.08. 
No evidence of lack of fit (P > 0.1) 
Pure error test - F = 0.56 P = 0.7629 DF(pure error) = 53 
The value of R2 (coefficient of determination) implies that "28.2 percent of the 
sample variation from the mean of the level of official corruption can be explained by the 
change in the anti-drug action curve." The f-ratio is also good, and there is no evidence of 
lack-of-fit or linear correlation of the error terms. In general, the results of the regression are 
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strong enough to say that the model captures the real relationship between these two 
variables. Figure 7 is the residual vs. fit plot, and it shows no evident pattern in the 
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Figure 8. Normal Plot (ERROR1 vs NSCORE1) 
distribution of errors, indicating that all the patterns are being captured by the model. Figure 
8 is the normal plot. It shows a very good approximation of a straight line, reinforcing the 
assumption that the error terms are randomly distributed. 
As an alternative to the preceding case, the same regression was run without the 
unusual values. If we adjust data points number 31 (Feb 93), 37 (Aug 93), and 50 (Sept 94) 
to follow the general trend, the regression results are: the t-ratios are both over 6.0, the f-ratio 
is significant, and R2 improved to 39 percent. This means that if we adjust unusual 
observations to conform with the general trend, the results are better. The question is: how 
reliable is our adjustment? Which of the two models represents a better fit of the data? 
Although the last one gives better numbers, the former is reality. Therefore, we will use the 
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Figure 9. Time Series Plot of LEVEL1 smdACCIONl 
Figure 9 is a time series plot of the variables' LEVEL1 and ACCION1. In this figure, 
correlation between the variables can be seen. Although it is not a perfect correlation (as 
demonstrated before), the two curves follow similar patterns during specific periods. 
3.        Relationship Between The Economist and the Anti-Drug Action Curve 
To establish the relationship between the corruption level measured by the number 
of articles published by The Economist (LEVEL2), additional computations are needed 
because as we mentioned in Section A of this chapter, the two levels are poorly correlated. 
The first step is to run a regression using the same time frame as with El Tiempo, and with 
the action curve (ACCION1) as the independent variable. As expected, the results are poor: 
the t-ratio for the constant is insignificant, (t-ratio=0.60, p=0.552) and, for the independent 
variable, is very close to the lower limit (t-ratio=2.S5, p=0.006). The Rl is also low (12.1 
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Figure 10. LEVEL2 (Quarterly)and ,4 CCJOiVi (LEVEL2 vsACCIONl) 
variable ACCION1. In summary, this model is not a good representation of the relationship. 
Figure 10 is a scatter plot of LEVEL! vs ACCION1. 
Looking to improvement of the model, the data was arranged on a quarterly basis. 
The intention was to eliminate the errors introduced by the small number of articles 
published monthly. The regression then was conducted using the number of articles 
published by The Economist grouped by quarters as the dependent variable, and the "anti- 
drug" action curve (ACCION1) as the independent variable. 
The regression equation is: 
LEVEL2  = 0.432  + .000012 ACCION1. (5) 
Predictor Coefficient Standard Deviation t-ratio P 
Constant 0.4316 0.7299 0.59 0.558 
ACCIONl 0.00001242 0.00000373 3.33 0.002 
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Analysis of Variance: 
Source DF SS MS F P 
Regression 1 55.479 55.479 11.10 0.002 
Error 41 204.986 5.000 
Total 42 260.465 
Unusual Observations: 





19 196479 13.000 2.873 0.352 10.127 4.59R 
41 388119 5.000 5.253 0.872 -0.253 -0.12x 
42 388119 8.000 5.253 0.872 2.747 1.33x 
43 388119 8.000 5.253 0.872 2.747 1.33x 
R
 denotes an observation with a large standard residual. 
x
 denotes an observation whose X value gives it large influence. 
Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.40. 
No evidence of lack of fit (P > 0.1) 
Pure error test - F = 7.60 P = 0.0000 DF(pure error) = 23 
As we can see from the output, in this form, results are better. In this case, 21.3 
percent of the total variation of the corruption level from the mean can be explained by 
changes in the "anti-drug" action curve. Figure 11 is the residual vs. Fit plot. Although it is 
difficult to find a pattern in the plot, it does not look as random as the residual vs. Fit plot 
using the information from the El Tiempo. There is a slight indication of curvature in the 
error terms from 2.80 in the fit axis. Figure 12 is the normal plot which shows little curvature 
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4.        Comparing Results and Interpretations 
To compare the results of the relationship between the level of corruption measured 
by El Tiempo and by The Economist with the anti-drug action curve developed in Chapter IV, 
the regression results are summarized in Table 8. 
INDICATOR El Tiempo (LEVEL1) The Economist (LEVEL2) 
Equation LEVEL1 = 4.07+0.000015/1CC/0JW LEVEL2 = 0.432+0.000012ACCION1 
Constant t-ratio 5.32,  p = 0.000 0.59,  p = 0.558 
ACCIONJ t-ratio 4.82,  p = 0.000 3.33,  p = 0.002 
Standard Error 2.882 2.236 
R-squared 28.2 percent 21.3 percent 
F statistics 23.22,  p = 0.000 11.10,   p = 0.002 
Durbin-Watson 2.08,   no serial correlation 1.40,   serial correlation 
Lack of Fit No evidence of Lack of Fit No evidence of Lack of Fit 
Table 8. Comparing the Regression Outputs Using the Two Sources of Data 
The regression using LEVEL! (number of articles published by El Tiempo) is a better 
model to represent the relationship between the "war on drugs," (action curve) and the level 
of official corruption in Colombia. The statistical output shows that the model using LEVEL! 
is a good model to represent the relationship of the two variables. Note that with LEVEL!, 
all the regression assumptions are met: the variables are linearly related, t and f statistics are 
significant, there is no serial correlation between the error terms (Durbin-Watson is 2.08), and 
there is no evidence of lack-of-fit. Another strong argument in favor of the LEVEL! 
relationship is that El Tiempo is a national newspaper in Colombia. Therefore, it will capture 
the level of official corruption more accurately. The relationship using LEVEL2 (The 
Economist) is weaker than LEVEL!, but is valid. Since no good correlation exists between 
El Tiempo and The Economist, the decision on which set of data to use becomes a judgment 
call. Relying on the assumption that because El Tiempo is a national newspaper and it 
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captures more information regarding the general level of corrupt practices in Colombia, the 
corruption level measured by the number of articles published by El Tiempo {LEVEL!) will 
be used as the primary relationship in the context of this thesis. 
5.        Cause and Effect 
Establishing the cause and effect relationship between two variables is not an easy 
task. Statistical packages give information on mathematical correlation but are not 
themselves capable of establishing which variable is the cause and which the effect. To do 
that, one must analyze the figures and make an interpretation based on the results and one's 
understanding of real world circumstances. 
Was the level of official corruption in Colombia causing an increase in the effort 
against illegal drugs? Or was the increasing effort against illegal drugs causing official 
corruption in Colombia to increase? 
The author's judgment is that the action against illegal drugs is probably the cause, 
and official corruption in Colombia is one of the effects. This judgment is supported by two 
approaches. The first approach is my understanding of the situation, and the second one is 
using analytical procedures. 
First, the data used in this investigation includes all kinds of official corruption in 
Colombia; it was not limited to drug related corruption. It is improbable, therefore, that the 
Colombian government would take action against illegal drug traffic based only on the 
overall level of official corruption. From the discussion in Chapter II, it can be seen that 
Colombian anti-drug policy has been driven primarily by U.S. pressures and internal political 
events. The primary purpose of the war on drugs from Colombia's point of view is to reduce 
trafficking and gain the respect of the international community, and is not to reduce official 
corruption. However, the reduction of official corruption may be a secondary objective. 
The second approach is using analytical procedures. If publicity about corruption, 
as represented by the number of newspaper articles, is what led the government to take 
further action, then there would likely be a lag between when the publicity occurs and when 
the government acts. Therefore, regressing ACCION1 on LEVEL1 with a lag should show 





shows, the strongest relationship, as measured by the F-statistic, the t-ratios and the R- 
squared, occurs when ACCION1 is regressed on LEVEL1 with no lag. Although the 
relationship is stronger with a two-period lag than with a one-period lag, the strongest 
relationship occurs with no lag. 
These two approaches led the author to conclude, that it is very likely that official 
corruption in Colombia is one of the effects of the war on drugs. 
On the other hand, since the data is arranged in time sequence, the possibility of a 
lagged relationship between the original dependent variable and the explanatory variable 
exists. 
If the correlation between the two variables is stronger after lagging the dependent 
variable (official corruption), the effect of the explanatory variable (Anti-Drug action curve) 
is delayed by the amount of the lag. If the strongest correlation is obtained without a lag, the 
effects are immediate. 
Results of these lagged regressions, also summarized in Table 9, show that there is 
a slight but not significant delay for the effect to take place. The impact of the level of action 
against illegal drugs on official corruption in Colombia is not immediate. Although the 
difference in the coefficient of correlation value is not significant for the analysis (i.e. from 
28.2% to 29.1% with one month lag), this fact reinforces the assumption that official 
corruption in Colombia is probably an effect of the level of action against illegal drugs. 
C.       SUMMARY 
Chapter V, Data Analysis and Interpretation, is divided in two main sections. The 
first one is a brief explanation of the statistical concepts and definitions used in the analysis. 
The second section is the analysis itself, and it is arranged in a logical sequence to help the 
reader understand the process followed to obtain the results. The first step was to find the 
relationship between the two sets of data used to measure official corruption in Colombia (El 
Tiempo and The Economist). Results indicate that the two variables are not highly correlated. 
The next step was to establish the relationship between the Anti-Drug action curve 
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Several alternatives with the original data were considered but only the most relevant ones 














LEVEL! ACCION1 0 28.2% 5.32, p=0.000 4.82, p=0.000 23.2, p=0.000 
LEVEL1 ACCION1 1 29.1% 5.05, p=0.000 4.88, p=0.000 23.7, p=0.000 
LEVEL! ACCIONI 2 23.6% 5.16,p=0.000 4.20, p=0.000 17.6, p=0.000 
LEVEL! ACCION1 3 19.4% 5.21,p=0.000 3.67,p=0.001 13.4, p=0.001 
ACCION1 LEVEL! 0 28.2% 2.48, p=0.016 4.82, p=0.000 23.2, p=0.000 
ACCION1 LEVEL! 1 22.6% 2.64,p=0.011 4.12,p=0.000 16.9, p=0.000 
ACCION1 LEVEL! 2 26.0% 2.45,p=0.017 4.48, p=0.000 20.4, p=0.000 
ACC10N1 LEVEL! 3 19.5% 2.75, p=0.008 3.68,p=0.001 13.5, p=0.00 
Table 9. Lagged Regression Results 
The two final relationships: LEVEL1 and LEVEL2, summarized in Table 8 were 
considered. LEVEL1 is the level of corruption measured with the number of articles 
regarding official corruption in Colombia published by El Tiempo from 1990 to 1995. 
LEVEL2 is the level of corruption measured with the number of articles regarding official 
corruption published by The Economist magazine from 1985 to 1995. 
LEVEL1 was selected as the better model in the context of the thesis. The decision 
relied on its comparative statistical significance and on the assumption that having its 
headquarters in Santfe de Bogota D.C., Colombia's capital, the number of articles in this 
subject captures more accurately the level of official corruption in Colombia. 
Finally, to verify if there is a lagged relation between the two variables, a lagged 
regression was conducted. Results indicate that there is a slight delay for the effects to take 
place. Lagged regression was also conducted swapping the dependent and explanatory 
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published by El Tiempo causes the action against illegal drags to increase. Results indicate 




VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Is there a significant relationship between official corruption in Colombia and the 
effort to reduce illegal drug activities? The aim of this thesis is to answer this question using 
analytical and intuitive techniques. This chapter summaries the findings and gives final 
thoughts regarding anti-drug policy. This chapter also include recommendations to improve 
future research in this area. Before going any further, it is important to review the basic 
assumptions used in the thesis, which should to be kept in mind when reading this chapter. 
• The analysis assumed that the number of articles regarding corruption and 
government officials published by the newspaper El Tiempo from 1990 to 1995 
represent a good approximation of the level of official corruption in Colombia. 
• The newspaper El Tiempo is unbiased regarding political issues and corrupt 
practices by government officials. 
A.       CONCLUSIONS 
1.        Policy Issues 
Regarding policy issues, it is clear that both the United States and Colombia are 
engaged in the war on drugs. Each country sees the problem from a different perspective but 
the main objective of reducing illegal drug trafficking is shared. The fact that the United 
States concentrates more on supply-side solutions, and Colombia advocates demand 
reduction solutions is a logical consequence of the kind of problem that the illegal drug trade 
represents to each country. 
Even though both countries have a well established anti-drug policy, the United 
States is more consistent in terms of goals and objectives. Colombia's anti-drug policy 
during the last five years has gained in consistency and continuity, but the general trend 
over the years has been one of reaction to external pressure and to specific internal events. 
Looking at the evolution and the different circumstances tied with illegal drug 
activities over the last twenty years, it is obvious that the United States has exerted weighty 




problem. In most of the cases this influence is seen as an involvement in the internal affairs 
of the country, resulting in anti-U.S. feelings. 
2.        Findings 
In Chapter V, corruption as measured by the information from El Tiempo was 
selected as the best approximation to represent official corruption in the relationship between 
official corruption in Colombia and the effort to reduce illegal drug trafficking, commonly 
called the "war on drugs." 
The basic result from the data analysis is that "28.2 percent of the total variation in 
the level of official corruption in Colombia can be explained by changes in the level of effort 
in the conduct of the war on drugs," meaning that in fact there is a direct linear relationship 
between these two variables. We can say, based on the results, and on the assumptions, that 
if the level of anti-drug action increases, the level of official corruption will increase but not 
in the same proportion. This relationship seems to be in line with reality, and with the way 
individuals react to incentives. To illustrate this, consider the hypothetical case of no action 
against illegal drug trade. In that situation, there is no need for drug dealers to expend money 
and resources to buy government "protection," or bribe officials to conduct their operations. 
As a result, official corruption caused by this kind of activity will be minimal. Conversely, 
if there is some level of action against the illegal drug trade, corruption would be expected 
to be higher. 
The result also provides an interesting insight if we look at it from a different 
perspective. Since official corruption in Colombia and the war on drugs are linearly related, 
the presence of corruption in Colombia leads to the conclusion that the government is acting 
against the problem. 
The 28.2 percent in the coefficient of determination suggests that there are important 
explanatory variables missing from the model. Recall that the articles selected for the 
analysis are those related to official corruption in Colombia. Therefore, the data covers the 
whole range of corrupt practices, not only illegal-drug related. Corruption in Colombia is 





(development federation) and the Contraloria General11 in 1994 revealed that the most 
common corrupt practices in Colombia are: fraud, bribery, illicit contracting, and document 
alteration. [Ref. 21] In addition to that, Cepeda [Ref. 22] presents the results of a survey 
conducted on the perception of the Colombian public regarding corruption. The results are 
that 54 percent of the people thinks that the problem is very widespread and 28 percent that 
the problem is widespread. This suggests that the level of corruption in Colombia is high. 
The results of the analysis also leads to the following conclusion: illegal drug activities are 
not the only cause of official corruption in Colombia. In fact, we can say that illegal drug 
activities cause between twenty and forty percent of corrupt practices among government 
officials. 
B.        RECOMMENDATIONS 
The phenomenon of corruption includes so many variables that trying to explain it 
completely in an individual research is almost impossible. The best contribution that 
researchers can make to clarify the question is to conduct a separate analysis with the 
intention to build a knowledge base that enables a larger perspective of corruption. 
Based on the results of this research, I believe that the following topics deserve 
further study: 
• The time frame for the articles published by El Tiempo (1990 to 1995) is too 
short. Expanding this time frame to 1975 to 1995 would give a more accurate 
relationship between official corruption and the war on drugs. 
• Dividing the information on corruption in Colombia by corrupt practices i.e., 
drug-related, will provide a direct relationship between the war on drugs and the 
level of corruption caused by illicit drug activities. 
17
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• A similar study but using official records regarding number of officials convicted 
on drug-related corrupt practices will provide a base to compare the social 
research technique used in this thesis to the real situation in Colombia. 
• Another interesting aspect of this research would be to study to what extent the 
United States assistance programs are contributing to the problem. Do the 
assistance programs encourage corrupt practices in Colombia? Is the U.S. 






Articles Regarding Official Corruption in Colombia Published by EL TIEMPO 
from August 1990 to August 1995 
Date 
(M/D/Y) 
Article Title Page 
08/04/90 JUECES DE ORDEN PUBLICO: DE INVESTIGADORES A 
INVESTIGADOS 
1A 
08/05/90 AUN NO MEDIMOS EL PRECIO SOCIAL DE LA CORRUPCION 
(Violation de derechos humanos) 
12A 
09/08/90 LA PAZ DEL PAIS ES MI RETO HISTORICO 
(Narcoterrorismo y Paramilitares) 
6A-7A 
09/08/90 CREAN FRENTE COMUN CONTRA LA CORRUPCION 1A-8A 
09/10/90 EL ALTO PRECIO DEL CONSUMO DE DROGA 3A 
09/12/90 CORRUPCION E INDIFERENCIA 4A 
09/12/90 CORRUPCION PEOR QUE GUERRILLA: PROCURADOR 1A-13A 
09/15/90 ADUANA: SINCERIDAD Y NO MAS DOBLE MORAL 8A 
09/20/90 JUECES PODRIAN BUSCAR A LOS NARCOS INTERESADOS 14A 
09/21/90 SOBRE LA PROCURADURIA 4A 
09/30/90 COMO ROB AR $1,000 MILLONES? 1A-8A 
09/30/90 PROCURADOR INCOMODO? 5A 
10/04/90 CONTRAESCAPE 4A 
10/06/90 GOBIERNO JUSTIFICA LA INVERSION ESTATAL EN SERVICIOS 
"PTRIVATIZAR NO ES EL NORTE DEL GOBIERNO": GAVIRIA 
9A 
10/18/90 NUEVA ORGANIZACION A INSPECCIONES DE POLICIA "JUSTICIA 
CASERA, JUSTA Y PRONTA" 
1C 
11/03/90 DEFENSA DEL ESTADO COLOMBIANO EN ALEMANIA 
PROCURADOR "SUPERAMOS CRISIS DEL NARCOTRAFICO" 
9B 
11/09/90 TORRE: IMPUESTOS...LIBERALES? 5A 
11/12/90 DICE QUE LA CRISIS SE DEBE A LA CORRUPCION. ESPINOSA 
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Article Title Page 
11/13/90 A GAVIRIA SE LE DESBOCO EL CABALLO DE LA CONSTITUYENTE 
"SOMOS UNA ALTERNATIVA SERIA": RAMIREZ 
9A 
11/14/90 NO ES LA PANACEA OPINION DE LA CONSTITUYENTE 5A 
11/18/90 ME HE SENTIDO GOLPEADO CONTRA EL MUNDO (ALFONSO 
GOMEZ MENDEZ) 
12A 
11/20/90 GAVIRIA PROPONE NUEVA CONCEPCION DE LA SEPARACION DE 
PODERES. MAYOR CONTROL POLITICO DEL CONGRESO AL 
GOBIERNO 
8A 
11/23/90 DURAS CRITICAS DEL DIRECTOR DE ADUANAS. FENALCO PIDE 
LOS REMATES DE ADUANA 
14A 
11/24/90 COMO RESPALDO AL PROCURADOR ALFONSO GOMEZ MENDEZ 
RENUNCIA MASIVA EN LA PROCURADURIA 
9A 
12/13/90 PROCURADOR: CREO EN PROCESOS PACIFICOS 1A-8A 
12/22/90 VIVIENDA POPULAR, EN MANOS DE MUNICIPIOS 3A 
12/24/90 "INTERPRETAMOS CON COHERENCIA LA VOLUNTAD DE LOS 
COLOMBIANOS": MAZA 
8A 
02/15/91 LOTES SE "ESFUMAN" SIN QUE SUS DUENOS LO SEPAN (entidades 
publicas se acusan) 
1A 
02/25/91 LA CUEVA DEL PIRATA (deshonestidad de funcionarios claves, desorden 
contable) 
1A 
02/26/91 EL OTRO ASALTO (la salud, una feria de escandalos) la 
03/05/91 PRUEBAS AL PROCURADOR 7A 
03/07/91 1,800 PERSONAS INVESTIGADAS 1A 
03/09/91 "MORALIZACION ES NUESTRA BANDERA": LOPEZ 11A 
03/13/91 LOS JUECES SIN ROSTRO, ALGO ASI COMO UNA "SESION DE 
BRUJOS" 
1A 
03/17/91 EL ESTADO DE LA NACION NUNCA FUE TAN MALO COMO AHORA, 
DICE LLERAS 
8A 
03/21/91 GAVIRIA ASUME CAMP ANA PARA ERRADICAR INMORALIDAD 
PUBLICA 
1A 
03/28/91 CORRUPCION, ACCION EN CUATRO FRENTES 1A 
04/09/91 CONFISCACION A RIQUEZAS ILICITAS 1A 
04/15/91 ISS: TRAFICO CON PENSIONES 1A 
04/22/91 RADIOGRAFIA DE LA ECO-IMPUNIDAD 1A 
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Article Title Page 
04/24/91 EXPROPIACION CON INDEMNJZACION PREVIA 1A 
04/25/91 LA CONSTITUYENTE ABRE PASO A LA ELECCION POPULAR DEL 
PROCURADOR 
7A 
04/25/91 DECLARAN GUERRA A LA INMORALIDAD 1A 
04/26/91 A LOS CORRUPTOS HABRA QUE PROBARLES, NO BASTA SABERLO 6A 
04/30/91 MURIO SOBREVIVIENTE DE ATENTADO EN CARCEL DE CALI 1A 
05/08/91 LA ADUANA AUN NO ESTA LISTA PARA LA APERTURA 11B 
05/15/91 LA MORALIZACION TAMBIEN LLEGA A LAS COOPERATIVAS 15A 
05/18/91 PRIVATIZAR: TRAGO DULCE O AMARGO? 7A 
05/26/91 SERIA GAVANTE DE LA ENTREGA DE ESCOBAR 1A 
05/29/91 OPERAN 15 AGENCIAS DE DENUNCIAS EN TODO EL PAIS 7A 
05/30/91 NUEVAS INVESTIGACIONES POR CORRUPCION EN CAJA AGRARIA 3C 
06/05/91 MILTON FRIEDMAN RESPONSABILIZA A ESTADOS UNIDOS DE 
NARCODEMOCRACIA EN COLOMBIA 
12A 
06/15/91 EXPROPIACION POR VIA ADMINISTRATIVA 7A 
06/21/91 ESCOBAR PODRIA DIRIGIR EL CARTEL DESDE LA PRISION 12A 
06/25/91 COTO A CORSARIOS DE LA ADUANA 4B 
06/28/91 EL FALLO CONTRA "NACHO" VIVES NO CAUSA SORPRESA 1A 
06/29/91 "NOS FORTALECIMOS," DICE EL PROCURADOR 13A 
07/01/91 JUSTICIA: TRASCENDENTALES REFORMAS EN CUATRO FRENTES 1A 
07/05/91 "HA RENACIDO LA ESPERANZA": PRESIDENTE GAVIRIA (mensaje a 
la guerrilla) 
1A-3A 
07/14/91 LA EMPRESA DE ENERGIA RECLAMA MAYORIA DE ED AD 21A 
07/14/91 LA TENAZA DE LA COCA IB 
07/29/91 CORRUPCION? CLARO QUE SI: CAJA AGRARIA 1A-3A 
08/07/91 POLITICA: EL COMIENZO DE LA RUPTURA 1A-3A 
08/12/91 A QUIEN LE ESTORBA EL INDERENA? 1A-3A 
08/13/91 "ADMINISTRACION PUBLICA LLEGO A GRADO INTOLERABLE DE 
CORRUPCION" 
9B 
08/27/91 ISS: PIDEN LA DESTITUCION DE 18 EMPLEADOS 1A-12A 
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Date 
(M/D/Y) 
Article Title Page 
09/03/91 LA CONTRALORIA PUBLICARA LISTA NEGRA DE EMPLEADOS 
CORRUPTOS 
8B 
09/07/91 MILLONARIO FRAUDE EN CARTAGENA (cajanal) 1A-8A 
09/08/91 LA APERTURA LE LLEGO A MINOBRAS 1A-4C 
09/11/91 FRAUDE MASIVO AL TESORO DEL ESTADO 1A-8A 
09/14/91 DIPLOMATICOS RESPONDEN DENUNCIAS DEL CONTRALOR 15A 
09/14/91 SALEN DOS JUECES POR CORRUPCION 1A-8A 
09/26/91 VIGENTE LA LEY ANTITERRORISTA 1A-8A 
09/27/91 ANTITERRORISMO, NOTA AL CONGRESO 3A 
09/28/91 DESCUBREN MILLONARIOS FRAUDES EN LA ENERGIA Y LA 
TESORERIA 
1A-7B 
09/28/91 RETIENEN DEVOLUCION DE INPUESTOS POR FRAUDE 1A-7B 
09/29/91 ADICION PRESUPUESTAL PARA ENRIQUECER A UN ABOGADO 16A 
10/02/91 GASOLINA: ALZA MAYOR QUEINFLACION 7C 
10/02/91 NO HAY DINERO PARA PAGAR A LOS PENSIONADOS DEL ISS 1A-8A 
10/08/91 ESCOBAR, JUICIO POR TERRORISMO 1A-7B 
10/16/91 EL GOLFO: UN PROBLEMA DE OPINION 1A-3A 
10/16/91 HAY FALTANTE DE $8,776 MILLONES: CONTRALOR 11C 
10/20/91 INSEGURIDAD, EL MAL PARA ATACAR EN BOGOTA: SAULO 
ARBOLEDA 
10A 
10/24/91 PROCURADURIA: 269 DENUNCIAS POR PARTICIPACION EN 
POLITICA 
9C 
11/03/91 PROCESO DE PAZ: HAY INTERESES INTERNACIONALES 1A-7A 
11/08/91 SAQUEARON EL MINOBRAS 
(procuradurfa encontrö irregularidades) 
1A-8A 
11/09/91 "MINISTERIO NO HA SIDO SAQUEADO": MINOBRAS 5B 
11/11/91 EL PRIMERO DE FEBRERO DEL 92 SE REANUDA EL PROCESO DE 
PAZ 
6A 
12/20/91 O HAY REAJUSTES EN TARIFAS O HAY GRAVE CAOS FINANCIERO 1A-8A 
01/09/92 FRENAR LA CORRUPCION EN LA ADMINISTRACION 1C 
01/19/92 NO HABRA MEDIACION EXTERNA EN PROCESO DE PAZ: GAVIRIA 8A 
82 
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Article Title Page 
01/26/91 SENADO: ANDA "PATAS ARRIBA" 1A-7A 
01/26/91 "NUEVA FRONTERA" EMPIEZA CAMP ANA CONTRA LA 
CORRUPCION 
20A 
01/31/92 SUCRE, ACORRALADO POR LA CORRUPCION Y LAS DEUDAS 10C 
02/02/92 NO SOY UN HOMBRE LIBRE: PAREJO 14A 
02/08/92 CITA DEL MUNDO CON EL DESARROLLO 1A-3A 
02/14/92 "SERE IMPLACABLE CON CORRUPTOS" 1A-6A 
02/17/92 PARAN REFORMA AL SISTEMA DE SALUD 1A-1B-2B 
02/20/92 FRENAN ARBITRARIEDAD CON RECURSOS DE TUTELA 1A-15A 
02/23/92 EL TESORO CSAI PIERDE 1,400 MILLONES DE PESOS 1C 
02/23/92 SE ESTAN REPARTIENDO A COLOMBIA IB 
03/15/92 HABRA CUERPO ELITE CONTRA LA CORRUPCION 12A 
03/17/92 CON DEBATE A LA PRENSA, CONGRESO ROMPE FUEGOS 6A 
03/20/92 ISS: PARCIAL PRIVATIZACION 1A-6C 
03/20/92 EL SOBORNO Y EL BOLETEO TIENEN POSTRADA A LA INGENIERIA 1A-8A 
03/20/92 CONTRALOR DENUNCIA SOBORNO GENERALIZADO EN 
CONTRATACION 
1A-8A 
03/28/92 NO CONTROLAMOS NI LA INMORALIDAD JUDICIAL 1A-12A 
03/29/92 "NO SOY UN MANO DURA": ENRIQUE PAREJO (dialogo de paz, 
inmoralidad de politicos y narcotrafico...) 
8A 
03/31/92 MONITORIA TRIBUTRIA A EMPLEADOS PUBLICOS 12A 
04/03/92 CASTRO: ASUMIRE LIDERAZGO MORAL 
(hay que erradicar präcticas que generan corruptelas) 
1A-1D 
04/05/92 EL ESTADO Y LOS SERVICIOS BASICOS 2C 
04/13/92 EL VEEDOR DEL TESORO PISA CALLOS 7A 
05/03/92 AUXILIOS NO PUEDEN PARALIZAR AL PAIS 10A 
05/08/92 LOS AUXILIOS SE SALVARAN EN LA CAMARA 1A-6A 
05/20/92 ROSSO SERRANO: URGE CARTEL MUNDIAL CONTRA LOS NARCOS 1A 
05/23/92 GAVIRIA INSISTE EN ESFUERZO FISCAL 3A 
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Article Title Page 
05/28/92 APAGON: ISA, GUERRILLA Y SINDICATOS 9A 
05/29/92 LOS ACUSADOS SE DEFIENDEN (racionamiento) 1A-5B 
05/29/92 8 DESTITUCIONES POR EL APAGON 9A 
06/07/92 JUSTICIA: UN PODER QUE SE DESPIERTA 13A 
06/09/92 "SE CONFUNDIO EL PAIS": GUSTAVO ARRIETA 
(acusaciones contra procuraduria) 
1A-8A 
06/10/92 CARGOS A 30 FUNCIONARIOS DE RISARALDA 9A 
06/19/92 NO APARECE EL EXGOBERNADOR DEL VALLE, E. GONZALEZ 
CAICEDO (un juez le dictaria auto de detention) 
7A 
06/28/92 ARRANCO EL "CUERPO ELITE" DE LA FISCALIA GENERAL DE LA 
NACION 
1A-11B 
06/28/92 SE DEMOSTRARA QUE EL CRIMEN NO ES RENTABLE IB 
06/28/92 ANONIMOS, EN LA "ENCRUCIJADA" 9A 
07/07/92 "LA GUERRILLA SE BURLA DE COLOMBIA" 1A-8A 
07/07/92 DESTITUIDOS 14,000 FUNCIONARIOS 7A 
07/08/92 HAY TRAFICO DE ORGANOS: DEFENSOR 1A-8A 
07/19/92 "NO HAY NADA NORMAL EN CARCEL DE ENVIGADO" (criticas por 
supuestas irregularidades en la cärcel donde esta P. Escobar) 
17A 
07/22/92 DESCUBREN FALTANTES POR $7,400 MILLONES 11C 
07/31/92 DESCUBRIR A CULPABLES, PRIORIDAD DEL ESTADO 1A-10A 
08/06/92 HUBO CRIMENES EN LA CATEDRAL: FISCAL 
(Pablo Escobar ordenaba ejecuciones desde la cärcel) 
1A-8A 
08/07/92 "HUBO MONSTRUOSOS JUICIOS DENTRO DE LA CATEDRAL" 
(corruption en la cärcel donde estuvo Pablo Escobar) 
7A 
08/08/92 DEMASIADAS CARTAS Y POCO DE SEGURIDAD 2A-3A 
08/11/92 COLOMBIA ASEGURA MAS AYUDA CONTRA LAS DROGAS 6A 
08/14/92 SERIO ENJUICIAMIENTO A LA CG HACE SERPA 1A-7A 
08/17/92 CRUZADA POR LA JUSTICIA PIDE FAMILIA DE GALAN (lucha contra 
delito y corruption) 
1A-7A 
08/21/92 "DESPIDO MASIVO ES VIABLE SI SE REESTRUCTURA EL ESTADO" 8B 
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Article Title Page 
08/31/92 CORRUPCION: LISTO EL PLAN DE ACCION 1A-3A 
09/02/92 GAVIRIA: DAR LA CARA HA SIDO SIEMPRE MI ESTILO 1A-6A 
09/03/92 "OJO CON EL PRESUPUESTO DEL 93" 5A 
09/06/92 EL "EXPEDIENTE" DE LA CATEDRAL... 3A 
09/08/92 MORALIZACION, TEMA DEL DIA EN PALACIO 7A 
09/09/92 ARTILLERIA PESADA CONTRA CORRUPCION 7A 
09/13/92 FISCAL: EL PAIS, HAMBRIENTO DE LIDERES 8A 
09/14/92 PROCURADURIA: BAJO LA PRESION DE LA AMENAZA 15A 
09/28/92 "EL SECTOR PRIVADO TAMBIEN ES CORRUPTO" 1A-14A 
09/29/92 RAMOANTE CORRUPCION EN NARINO: PROCURADURIA 9A 
10/13/92 LA CONTRATACION, A TONO CON LA APERTURA 9A 
10/15/92 PLAN DE EMERGENCIA POR POSIBLE PARO EN EL ISS 1A-8A 
10/17/92 MILLONARIA EVASION EN SEGURO OBLIGATORIO 9A 
10/17/92 ANULAN ELECCION DEL ALCALDE DE ARAUCA 5B 
10/19/92 ESTRATEGIA NACIONAL CONTRA LA CORRUPCION 1A-7A 
10/20/92 ES URGENTE Y NECESARIO (controlar cumplimiento de obras publicas, 
servicios y corruption de funcionarios) 
6A 
10/22/92 "EL PRESIDENTE NO ES RESPONSABLE": VELEZ 
(fiiga de Pablo Escobar) 
10A 
10/22/92 A EXPLICAR LA RIQUEZA REPENTINA 10A 
10/23/92 COMERCIO DEBE PREPARARSE PARA LA APERTURA: 
MINDESARROLLO 
4C 
10/23/92 EL CONTRALOR PROPONE JUECES ANTICORRUPCION 1A-8A 
10/25/92 EL FRENTE MORAL 5A-19A 
11/01/92 NI DIALOGO, NI GUERRA 9A 
11/01/92 QUIEN CUIDARA MEJOR SU PLATA? 1A-2B-3B 
11/01/92 MEMORIAL DE AGRAVIOS DE LA JUSTICIA PENAL 1A-17A 
11/04/92 SENADORES PEDIRAN CENSURA A CARRILLO 7A 
11/04/92 REVOCARON MANDATO POR MALOS MANEJOS 6B 
11/09/92 "AISLAR LA GUERRILLA Y ATACARLA..." 12A 
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11/11/92 "COLPUERTOS NO ES PARA RAPINA":GERENTE AC 
11/12/92 CERCA DE 800,000 PREDIOS NO PAGARAN VALORIZACION 3D 
11/19/92 GAVIR1A: NO A TIERRA ARRASADA 1A-13A 
11/26/92 PROPIEDADES ESTATALES DEBERAN TENER UN SEGURO 5C 
11/29/92 GAVIRIA: EL LIBERALISMO DEBE LIDERAR MODERNIZACION 9A 
11/30/92 INSISTEN EN LOS DIALOGOS DE PAZ 8A 
12/04/92 CAYO UNO DE LOS CABECILLAS DEL ELN 1A-14A 
12/08/92 LA LEY EMPRENDERA EL RESCATE DE LAS ASAMBLEAS 6A 
12/11/92 OFENSIVA CONTRA INVASORES DE CARCELES 24D 
12/19/92 AHORA NADIE NOS DETENDRA (Hidroelectrica del guavio) 1A-14A 
12/21/92 REPAROS JURIDICOS A REFORMA DEL ESTADO 1A-8A 
12/29/92 SE PIERDEN 55,000 MILLONES 9A 
12/30/92 POR DECRETO "BARREN" ENTIDADES DEL ESTADO 1A-8A 
12/31/92 REFORMA DEL ESTADO PASO A PASO 3A 
01/07/93 CORRUPCION: HACIA UNA NUEVA TERAPIA 6A 
01/10/93 JORGE GARCIA HURTADO (dineros publicos) 2A-4B 
01/12/93 DESORDEN CAUSA CORRUPCION EN EL CONGRESO 9A 
01/18/93 HABRA AJUSTES A POLITICA OFICIAL ANTICORRUPCION 1A-6A 
01/28/93 DETENCIONES: EN QUE SE BASA LA FISCALIA 1C 
01/28/93 "QUE TIEMBLEN QUIENES HAN MALGASTADO BIENES PUBLICOS" 1A 
01/29/93 SE ENTREGA JUAN MARTIN CAICEDO 1A-5D 
01/30/93 AUXILIO: 17 PROFUGOS 1A-4B 
01/31/93 "ESTAMOS ANTE UN GRAVE CAOS JURIDICO" 8D 
02/03/93 FISCAL: CONGRESISTAS TIENEN FUERO 6A 
02/12/93 CORTE SOLO JUZGARA A LOS CONGRESISTAS 1A-16A 
02/17/93 PROCESO PENAL A 5 POLITICOS 1A-12A 
03/12/93 BUCARAMANGA: INVESTIGAN ALCALDE Y 13 EXCONSEJALES 1A-8A 
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Article Title Page 
03/18/93 NO SE AHORRARA ESFUERZO PARA FRENAR CORRUPCION 1A-8A 
03/19/93 CARGOS AL VEEDOR DEL TESORO 1A-9A 
03/21/93 LA DEFORMACION DE LA POLICIA 2B 
03/22/93 "EL GOBIERNO NO JUEGA LIMPIO" 7A 
03/25/93 POLICIA PASARIA A MINGOBIERNO 1A-6A 
03/26/93 CUESTIONAN A DE GREIFF 1A-12A 
03/28/93 LA NEGLIGENCIA SERA CASTIGADA 17A 
04/11/93 CONSEJO SUPERIOR, TRAS EL JUEZ IDEAL 15A 
04/11/93 CORRUPCION EL VICIO DEL PODER 2B-3B 
04/13/93 ULTIMATUM EN CAJA AGRARIA 1A-1B 
04/15/93 IMPUESTOS Y ADUANAS: LIO DE INTRIGAS 1A-3C 
04/26/93 RECOMPENSA A QUIEN DENUNCIE CORRUPTOS 7A 
04/27/93 DETENIDA REHABILITACION DE RECLUSOS COLOMBIANOS 12C 
04/28/93 ARRESTARON AL TESORERO GENERAL DE CUNDINAMARCA 1A-8A 
04/30/93 OTRAS DOS DENUNCIAS PENALES POR AUXILIOS 12A 
04/30/93 TRANSITO Y TRANSPORTE: SENALES DE CORRUPCION IE 
04/30/93 AL BANQUILLO LAS INSPECCIONES 5E 
05/05/93 PIDEN DESTITUCION DE DOS ALCALDES 8C 
05/08/93 GOLPEADA LA CORRUPCION 7D 
05/16/93 COMO SE ENRIQUECE UN FUNCIONARIO? 1A-17A 
05/17/93 EL VEEDOE CAUSA CAOS: CONTRALOR 1A-3B 
05/20/93 CONTRALOR PIDE PACTO CONTRA LA CORRUPCION 3C 
05/23/93 LA ANTICORRUPCION CON BANDERA 5A-9A 
05/28/93 LA CRUZADA ES CONTRA CORRUPCION: GAVIRIA 1A-8A 
05/31/93 "SAMPER, EL MISMO CON OTRA PINTURA" (lucha contra corrupciön, 
desempleo y driga) 
7A 
06/03/93 SENADOR RICAURTE LOZADA A LA CARCEL 1A-13C 
06/04/93 UN NUEVO ENBATE CONTRA CORRUPTOS 7A 
06/09/93 DOS MINISTROS A INVESTIGACION 1A-9C 
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Article Title Page 
06/10/93 CONTRALOR DESTRUYE A TRECE FUNCIONARIOS 8C 
06/13/93 "PRUEBAS CONTRA CIEN MIEMBROS DEL CARTEL" 1A-3A 
06/13/93 CARTA A UN FUNCIONARIO CORRUPTO 7A 
06/14/93 TRABAJADORES ESCOGERAN SISTEMA QUE LES CONVENGA 1A-8A 
06/16/93 PARTE NAVARRO EN LA CARRERA PROSELITISTA 1A-6A 
06/28/93 DESTITUIDOS 820 FUNCIONARIOS 23A 
07/03/93 REACCIONES ENCONTRADAS POR DESTITUCION DEL VEEDOR 7A 
07/04/93 DE LA VEEDURIA AL VEEDOR... 5A 
07/06/93 VEEDOR HA CUMPLIDO CON SU DEBER: IGLESIA 1A-6A 
07/18/93 CONGRESO: ORDEN PUBLICO SERA EL TEMA PRIORIDAD 1A-7A 
07/22/93 "ITAGUI NO ES NI SERA LA OTRA CATEDRAL..." 8A 
07/22/93 "GAVIRIA NO ES NEUTRAL": CONSERVADORES 1A-8A 
07/27/93 A INDAGATORIA 16 CONSEJEROS 1A-7B 
07/29/93 ASISTENTE DE CORRALES PRECISA LOS INCIDENTES 8A 
07/29/93 "PROCESO A CONSEJEROS DEBE SERIMPARCIAL" 8A 
07/29/93 RUIZ NO SERA JUEZ DE MAGISTRADOS 1A-7A 
08/01/93 MORDIDA, SERRUCHO, SOBORNO... Lecturas 
Dominicales 
08/01/93 "HAY QUE FREIR PECES GORDOS" (combatir un mal que golpea los 
sectores publico y privado) 
7A 
08/01/93 EXISTE UNA POLITICA CRIMINAL? CUAL...? 21A 
08/03/93 "CORRUPCION Y PODER VAN DE LA MANO" 7A 
08/05/93 COLOMBIA ESTARA EN LIGA MUNDIAL ANTICORRUPCION 7A 
08/08/93 CORRUPCION: SI SE PUEDE COMBATIR 7A 
08/08/93 GAVIRIA LA ULTIMA CUESTA (seguridad y justicia) 1A-1B 
2B-3B 
08/08/93 GOBIERNO Vs CORRUPCION 10A 
08/10/93 DISTRITO ENFRENTA 2,500 DEMANDAS 2C 
08/12/93 "CORRUPCION: EL RETO PARA COLOMBIA" 9C 
08/13/93 SE PUSO EN MARCHA REFORMA A LA POLICIA 1A-7B 
88 
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Article Title Page 
08/14/93 ARREMETIDA CONSERVADORA SOBRE LA MORAL 7A 
08/15/93 LA POLITICA SE CIVILIZA (desmilitarizaciön, corrupciön) 1A-17A 
08/18/93 CONTRALORIA LANZA CAMP ANA CONTRA CORRUPCION 4C 
08/20/93 "LA CORRUPCION GOLPEA A CUNDINAMARCA": CONTRALORIA 9C 
08/21/93 ALLANADO EL AEROPUERTO EL DORADO POR LA POLITICA 16B 
08/23/93 NARINO: 144 EXFUNCIONARIOS LLAMADOS A RENDIR CUENTAS ID 
08/29/93 CONSTITUYENTES FRENTE A LA CORRUPCION 20A 
08/29/93 CORRUPCION SE FRIEN O NO PECES GORDOS? 21A 
09/01/93 SAMPER SE IMPONE DISCIPLINA ETICA 1A-8A 
09/07/93 IRRESPONSABLES, A PAGAR (funcionarios) 1A-8A 
09/10/93 PLIEGO DE CARGOS A 5 EXALCALDES SE USAQUEN ID 
09/17/93 UNA CRUZADA LEGAL ANTICORRUPCION 8A 
09/19/93 "NO MAS ILUSIONISMO CONSTITUCIONAL" 12A 
10/03/93 HAY 389 ALCALDES EN LA MIRA DE LA FISCALIA 1A-21A 
10/05/93 GOBERNADOR DE AMAZONAS, DETENIDO 1A-8A 
10/08/93 "EN LUCHA ANTIDROGAS, HAY CORRUPCION EN E.U." 8B 
10/17/93 TODOS CONTRA LA CORRUPCION 1A-8A 
10/24/93 TOMAN EL PULSO A LA FISCALIA (estado de derecho) 9A 
10/24/93 LOS JUECES EN ZONAS ROJAS... 18A 
11/03/93 TERRORISTAS NO VAN A IMPEDIR ELECCIONES 1A-3A 
11/17/93 "LA CORRUPCION NO ES UN CAMINO SIN REGRESO" 6A 
11/18/93 "OJO CON ALCALDES CORRUPTOS 8A 
11/19/93 EL CIUDADANO, EL MEJOR PALADIN (combatir los niveles de 
corrupciön por parte de la ciudadania) 
8A 
11/20/93 VILLEGAS: "NO MAS INDIFERENCIA" (ministro de gobierno, no mäs 
amenazas contra el congreso por parte de la guerrilla) 
7A 
11/21/93 A LOS CORRUPTOS LES DEBE CAER LA GOTA FRIA 1A-10A 
11/22/93 PREPARAN CAMBIOS EN LAS FF. MM. Y LA PROCURADURIA 24A 
12/01/93 ENRIQUE PAREJO INICIARIA DIALOGOS DE PAZ CON VEEDURIA 
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Article Title Page 
12/12/93 FONDO DE IRREGULARIDADES 6A 
12/14/93 SANTAMARIA HABRIA SIDO NEGLIGENTE 1A-12A 
12/16/93 CAMARA PIDE REVOCAR MANDATO DE J. CASTRO 8A 
12/20/93 EL INTRA MURIO POBRE, PERO EFICIENTE 4B 
12/21/93 GOMEZ M. PIDE LUCHA FRONTAL A CORRUPCION 8A 
12/31/93 AL FIN CAYO ESCOBAR! 24D 
12/31/93 FUNCIONARIOS PUBLICOS DEBEN $5,461 MILLONES 1A-6A 
01/03/94 FISCALIA COMBATE LA IMPUNIDAD CON MECANISMOS DE 
NEGOCIACION 
1A-6C 
01/03/94 LE PONEN MAS DIENTES A LA LEY ANTICORRUPCION 1A-6A 
01/07/94 NINOS Y ANCIANOS, "MULAS" EN LA FRONTERA 9A 
01/09/94 NARCOS DE CALI NO HAN OFRECIDO NADA CONCRETO 1A-14A 
01/13/94 REAJUSTAN SUELDO DE LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS 1A-8A 
02/09/94 HASTA EL FINAL LUCHARE CONTRA LA CORRUPCION 1A-7A 
02/11/94 PASTRANA SE LANZA AL AGUA 1A-6A 
02/11/94 SE PERDIERON $11,3 MILLONES DEL DAS 9D 
02/27/94 ALTO COMISIONADO PARA PRISIONES 1A-23A 
03/01/94 "COLOMBIA, TERCER EXPORTADOR DE HEROINA" 9A 
03/02/94 MAS DE 45 MIL POLICIAS A LA CALLE 12A 
03/03/94 CALDERA DESCARTA MAXIDEVALUACION 1A-8A 
03/23/94 PLIEGO DE CARGOS CONTRA 13 EXFUNCIONARIOS DE ARAUCA 10C 
03/27/94 HOMMES CRITICA ABUSOS DE LOS CONGLOMERADOS 1A-10A 
04/07/94 DURO RECHAZO DE FISCALIA A UN INFORME DE E.E. U.U. 1A-8A 
04/07/94 NARCOTRAFICANTES MANIPULAN SISTEMA JUDICIAL 
COLOMBIANO 
8A 
04/09/94 "FISCAL NO DEBE ACTUAR COMO ISLA": PROCURADOR 8A 
04/14/94 LIBERALES URGEN APROBAR ESTATUTO ANTICORRUPCION 7A 
04/20/94 VARIOS ALCALDES ESTAN EN APRIETOS 1A-9B 
04/21/94 HASTA POR UNA EMPANADA SE CAE UN ALCALDE POPULAR 15A 
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04/26/94 COCAINA EN 9 PAISES DE AMERICA LATINA 3A 
05/15/94 SANTA ROSA, BAJO LA LEY DE LA GUERRILLA 6A 
05/15/94 CUANDO LOS RECLUSOS CONTROLAN LAS LLAVES 16A 
05/20/94 "A DESHIPOTECAR EL VOTO" 7A 
05/25/94 CACERIA EN BANCA A FORTUNAS ILEGALES 9B 
05/29/94 SIN ETICA NO SE PUEDE GOBERNAR 4A 
06/01/94 GREMIOS RAJARON A LA DIAN EN SU PRIMER ANO 1A-8B-9B 
06/07/94 BUSCAN MAS INSTRUMENTOS ANTICORRUPCION 13A 
06/26/94 LA POBREZA, AGUIJON ELECTORAL 10A 
07/03/94 POLITICA INTERFIERE AL COMISIONADO 1A-16A 
07/07/94 TERNA PARA LA FISCALIA 1A-8A 
07/08/94 GOBIERNO PRIVATIZA 5 ZONAS FRANCAS 6B-7B 
07/08/94 QUIENES SON LOS POSIBLES FISCALES? 3A 
07/16/94 COLOMBIA RECHAZARIA AYUDA 1A-6A 
07/17/94 DEVALUAR AHORA SERIA UN SUICIDIO: HOMMES 1A-4C-5C 
07/17/94 JESSE HELMS, DURO Y RADICAL 7A 
07/17/94 MISION: INVESTIGACION POR ENRIQUECIMIENTO 28A 
07/20/94 EL GENERAL GIL UN GUERRERO 3A 
07/29/94 ESTADO, LISTO PARA EL SAQUEO: VEEDOR 8A 
08/02/94 EL SENADO ELIGE HOY PROCURADOR 1A-3A 
08/02/94 QUE ES Y QUE TIENE LA PROCURADURIA 3A 
08/03/94 VASQUEZ EL NUEVO PROCURADOR 1A-9A 
08/05/94 AERONAUTICA. "HAY FALLAS DE SEGURIDAD" 1A-8A 
08/07/94 UN ARRANQUE TRANSPARENTE 9A 
08/07/94 PODRIA COLOMBIA LIBRARSE DE NARCOS? 9A 
08/14/94 NO MAS PELEAS EN LA JUSTICIA 1A-18A 
08/15/94 INVESTIGACION. EXTRANA OLA DE ASESINATOS EN CALI 12A 
08/21/94 CARTEL DE CALI, UN CALLEJON SIN SALIDA? 1A-26A 
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08/26/94 FISCALIA RASTREA FESTIN DE AUXILIOS 15A 
08/27/94 SE DESCENTRALIZA LA CORRUPCION AFIRMA LA CONTRALORIA IB 
09/04/94 CUERPO DE CHOQUE ANTICORRUPTOS 9A 
09/21/94 LOS CARTELES SIGUEN ALZANDO VUELO 1A-15A 
09/23/94 REORGANIZACION FISCALIA POR PRIORIDADES ANTICRIMEN 1A 
10/01/94 DIRECTORIO NACIONAL CONSERVADOR REVISARIA RELACIONES 
CON SAMPER 
8A 
10/02/94 DEA CON RABO DE PAJA 1A-24A 
10/09/94 EL ESTADO PATROCINARA LAS INVESTIGACIONES CIUDADANAS 10A 
10/13/94 GERENTES TAMBIEN SE QUEDAN CON LOS RECURSOS DEL 
ESTADO 
11B 
10/16/94 LA CORRUPCION NO ES SOLO DEL CONGRESO 11A 
10/17/94 NARCONGRESISTAS Y CORRUPCION 5A 
10/21/94 DLN PEDIRA 30 EXPULSIONES 1A-6A 
10/24/94 ATLANTICO (desconoce su autentica vocation econömica) 9A 
10/25/94 LA MODERNIZACION HA LOGRADO FRENAR LA CORRUPCION 10C 
10/30/94 "EXAMINEN LOS HECHOS MAS QUE LOS CHISMES" 24A 
11/06/94 AHORA QUE SE ATENGAN TODOS LOS CORRUPTOS 2B 
11/09/94 LOS DOCE PUNTOS DE NEGOCIACION DEL ELN 1A-15A 
11/12/94 SUBSIDIOS: POLITICA TRAIDA DE LOS CABELLOS 8E 
11/22/94 EL CONGRESO: 12 DIAS CONTRA EL RELOJ 6A 
11/24/94 OFENSIVA CONTRA NARCOLEY 1A-2A 
12/01/94 AGRABAN CASTIGO PARA QUIEN ROBE AL FISCO 6A 
12/05/94 LE LLEGA COMPANIA A LA TUTELA 3A 
12/07/94 "SOY UN GUERRERO DEL NARCOTRAFICO": SERRANO 16A 
12/09/94 EN APUROS 1,205 EMPLEADOS PUBLICOS 3A 
12/12/94 CONTRATOS PUBLICOS 4A 
12/17/94 CON BUEN BALANCE CERRO EL CONGRESO 1A-6A 
12/29/94 "ESTOY BUSCANDO AGENDA PROPIA": (De La Calle) 1A-6A 
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Article Title Page 
12/30/94 MARIA IZQUIERDO SIGUE EN LA HOGUERA 1A-18A 
01/02/95 ALCALDES LE APUESTAN AL PACTO SOCIAL 7A 
01/03/95 EL CIUDADANO PUEDE RONDAR A SU ALCALDE 1A-3A 
01/04/95 DROGAS, UNA GUERRA PERDIDA? 1A-3A 
01/07/95 AUMENTO LA CORRUPCION 9A 
01/12/95 LEY PARA CAZAR FORTUNAS ILICITAS 1A-14A 
10/18/95 FRACASO EN LUCHA ANTISECUESTRO 1A-13A 
01/21/95 EN TELA DE JUICIO DENUNCIAS CONTRA AEROVIVIL 6A 
01/21/95 RECUPERAR LA FE EN LA JUSTICIA 5A-20A 
01/21/95 MARIO GONZALEZ VARGAS, SUPER JUEZ DE LA POLITICA 10A 
01/22/95 LUCHA ANTICORRPCION NO ADMITE NEGLIGENCIA 20A 
02/01/95 RECHAZAN CARCEL EN GORGONA 3A 
02/03/95 NUEVOS SOPORTES PARA LUCHA ANTICORRUPCION 6A 
02/05/95 NARCOS, AHORA AL PARAISO? 24A-25A 
02/05/95 POR CARTA Y POR TELEFONO SE LUCHARA CONTRA LA 
CORRUPCION 
1A 
02/07/95 LA CONTRALORIA PUBLICA LISTA NEGRA DE CORRUPTOS 1A-1B 
02/08/95 APAGAN MORAL 4A-9A 
02/26/95 LA MUERTE ANDA A MIL 6A 
02/26/95 MAS TRANSPARENCIA EN CONTRATOS DE FFAA. 18A 
02/26/95 "EXITO LIMITADO DE COLOMBIA EN LUCHA CONTRA LAS 
DROGAS" 
8A 
03/08/95 LA CAIDA DEL DOLAR AMENAZA CON UNA CRISIS MUNDIAL EN 
LOS MERCADOS FINANCIEROS 
3B 
03/12/95 LUCHA CONTRA LA CORRUPCION, DEBATE SUPERFICIAL? 2B 
03/15/95 PROPONEN JUICIO POLITICO A NARCOS 1A-8A 
03/21/95 AL CONGRESO, NUEVO ESTATUTO DEL MINISTERIO PUBLICO 8A 
03/21/95 ACUERDAN CACERIA DE CORRUPTOS 13 Judicial 
03/22/95 CAPTURA DE OTRO NARCO DE CALI ES FUNDAMENTAL 6A 
03/24/95 POLICIA DEPURA NIVEL DE OFICIALES 1A-3A 
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(M/D/Y) 
Article Title Page 
03/25/95 REESTRUCTURAN FISCOS REGIONALES 6A 
03/28/95 MAGISTERIO DE CASANARE ENTRA EN CESE AL FUEGO 4A 
04/02/95 ALCALDES, PRESOS DEL MIEDO 6A 
04/03/95 DEFIENDENINSTRUMENTOS CONTRA LA CORRUPCION 18A 
04/07/95 NARCOTRAFICO, SOLO UN ASPECTO DE LAS RELACIONES 8A 
04/09/95 MONTAJES, FOTOMONTAJES, MINISTROS Y DELFINES 3A 
04/09/05 POR QUE TE ODIO, TE DENUNCIO (fiincionarios sancionados, sector 
gobierno y fiscalizadores) 
1A-13A 
04/17/95 EL PAIS NO SEGUIRA CON BALANCES "CHIMBOS": NIETO 7A 
04/18/95 PLIEGO DE CONDICIONES A COLOMBIA 3A 
04/22/95 TRAMITES DE TRANSITO 1E-2E 
04/22/95 FUNCIONARIOS TIENEN QUE PAGAR POR SUS EQUIVOCACIONES 8B 
04/25/95 DECLARACION DE GIRALDO 1A-3A 
04/30/95 "NO ESTAN TODOS LOS QUE SON": GARCIA HURTADO 17A 
05/02/95 EL PADRE GALLO SE CONFIESA (narcotrafico, corrupcion rn la polftica) 3A 
05/05/95 CREAN GRUPO ELITE CONTRA LA CORRUPCION 
(se unen contralorfa, fiscalfa y procuradurfa) 
1A 
05/09/95 SAMPER CONSULTARA CON PARTIDOS CAMARA UNICA 11A 
05/10/95 A UN PASO, PROYECTO DE LEY ANTICORRUPCION 1A 
05/10/95 HABRA PROGRAMA DE DEPURACION EN FF.MM. 7B 
05/23/95 PREPARAN INVENTARIO DEL ESTADO 3B 
05/25/95 EN SUSPENSO LEY ANTICORRUPCION 9A 
05/29/95 BANCO MUNDIAL CRITICA OBRAS PUBLICAS 1A-1C 
05/30/95 NO SE HIZO UNA ADUANA PARA ANGELES 4B 
05/31/95 TERMINO "PARTO" DE LEY ANTICORRUPCION 8A 
05/31/95 SIN RESERVAS, PASO LA LEY ANTICORRUPCION 1A 
06/03/95 LA SOCIEDAD INTERAMERICANA DE PRENSA CENSURA "MICO" 
CONTRA PRENSA NACIONAL 
6A 
06/05/95 SHHH! (Pretenden combatir la corrupcion silenciando a la prensa, a la 
television, a la radio o limitandoles su actividad. Es un contrasentido) 
5A 
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06/07/95 SE INICIA OFENSIVA CONTRA "LAVADORES" 8A 
06/08/95 NUEVAS ARMAS PARA COMBATIR LA CORRUPCION 7A 
06/10/95 CARCELES CONDENADAS 4A 
06/13/95 TRAMITES INCULTOS ID 
06/15/95 TRANSITO Y SANCIONES 4A 
06/17/95 NARCODEMOCRACIA? 5A 
06/18/95 EL TERRORISMO NO LOGRO PARALIZAR AL CONGRESO 8A 
06/20/95 FARC SE ATRIBUTE PLAGIO DE RODRIGO TURBAY COTE 7A 
06/28/95 DE CAPATAZ A SEMI-ZAR DE LA COCA 9A 
06/30/95 EL GOBIERNO NACINAL CAYO EN SU PROPIA RED 6A 
07/02/95 LA CEDULA, DOCUMENTO VULNERABLE 1A 
07/03/95 PASOS CONTRA LA CORRUPCION 7A 
07/05/95 QUIEN TIENE EN LA MIRA A LOS PERSONEROS TOLIMENSES? 4A-6A 
07/07/95 RECHAZO A REFORMAS: DE LA CALLE 1A 
07/09/95 EL DIABLO HARA HOSTIAS? (Narcotraficantes) 5B 
07/14/95 "NO MAS JUEGO A LOS NARCOS": SERRANO 20A 
07/15/95 LA CORRUPCION, OTRO CARTEL 5A 
07/19/95 LOS DELITOS SEXUALES Y SUS PENAS 5A 
07/22/95 TURBAY: "NO ASPIRO A LA PRESIDENCIA" 6A 
07/24/95 LA OLA DE CORRUPCION 5A 
07/24/95 RESPALDO A LA POLITICA DE DEPURACION EN LA POLITICA 16A 
07/27/95 DERECHO AL HUECO 4A 
07/31/95 UN "WATERGATE" A LA COLOMBIANA? 6B 
08/06/95 LA ETICA POR LOS SUELDOS 4A 
08/06/95 CRONOLOGIA DE UNA HISTORIA NO ACLARADA 8A 
08/09/95 CAERA SAMPER? 1A 
08/11/95 NO CEDE LA CORRUPCION EN EL PAIS 3A 
08/13/95 ABUSO SEXUAL, MUCHO MAS QUE UN ASUNTO PENAL 2B 
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08/15/95 NAVARRO PIDE ANULAR ELECCIONES 8A 
08/18/95 IGLESIA PIDE COMPAS DE ESPERA PARA SAMPER (ruega a la 
guerrilla que cese violencia) 
6A 
08/19/95 "NO EXTRADICION, UN ERROR": FISCAL 1A 









Summary of the data and output from the regression between corruption, measured 
by the number of articles on official corruption published by Colombia's newspaper El 
Tiempo (LEVEL1), and action against illegal drug trafficking (ACCION1). 
The following is the definition of terms: 
LEVEL 1 Number of articles on corruption published by El Tiempo. 
COMMIT Level of commitment to act against the problem. 
POLBUD National Police budget in millions of pesos (constant 1995 pesos). 
ACCION1 Anti-Drug action curve. 
ERROR 1 Error terms in the regression. 
FIT1 Regression Fit. 
N.SCORE1 Normal Scores for the error terms. 
DATE LEVEL1 COMMIT POLBUD ACCION1 ERROR1 FIT1 N.Scorel 
Aug-90 2 0.2 408711 81742.22 -1.17852 5.333638 -1.23567 
Sep-90 10 0.2 408711 81742.22 1.64967 5.333638 1.720872 
Oct-90 3 0.2 408711 81742.22 -0.825 5.333638 -0.84685 
Nov-90 9 0.2 408711 81742.22 1.296146 5.333638 1.329401 
Dec-90 3 0.2 408711 81742.22 -0.825 5.333638 -0.84685 
Jan-91 0 0.2 427667 85533.42 -1.90513 5.392271 -1.72087 
Feb-91 3 0.2 427667 85533.42 -0.84521 5.392271 -0.93863 
Mar-91 7 0.2 427667 85533.42 0.568024 5.392271 0.734669 
Apr-91 8 0.2 427667 85533.42 0.921333 5.392271 1.075191 
May-91 6 0.2 427667 85533.42 0.214716 5.392271 0.184397 
Jun-91 6 0.2 427667 85533.42 0.214716 5.392271 0.184397 
Jul-91 5 0.2 427667 85533.42 -0.13859 5.392271 -0.08157 
Aug-91 4 0.2 427667 85533.42 -0.4919 5.392271 -0.58201 
Sep-91 11 0.2 427667 85533.42 1.981258 5.392271 1.937581 
Oct-91 7 0.2 427667 85533.42 0.568024 5.392271 0.734669 
Nov-91 4 0.2 427667 85533.42 -0.4919 5.392271 -0.58201 
Dec-91 1 0.2 427667 85533.42 -1.55183 5.392271 -1.5631 
Jan-92 5 0.2 500479 100095.7 -0.21769 5.617482 -0.12253 
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DATE LEVEL 1 COMMIT POLBUD ACCION1 ERROR1 FIT1 N.Scorel 
Mar-92 8 0.2 500479 100095.8 0.839945 5.617484 0.971056 
Apr-92 3 0.2 500479 100095.8 -0.92278 5.617484 -1.00455 
May-92 8 0.2 500479 100095.8 0.839945 5.617484 0.971056 
Jun-92 7 0.2 500479 100095.8 0.487399 5.617484 0.631201 
Jul-92 6 0.5 500479 250239.5 -0.67942 7.939511 -0.70809 
Aug-92 9 0.5 500479 250239.5 0.371493 7.939511 0.44212 
Sep-92 9 0.5 500479 250239.5 0.371493 7.939511 0.44212 
Oct-92 11 0.5 500479 250239.5 1.072099 7.939511 1.235666 
Nov-92 12 0.5 500479 250239.5 1.422402 7.939511 1.563103 
Dec-92 8 0.5 500479 250239.5 0.021189 7.939511 0 
Jan-93 9 0.5 597529 298764.5 0.109047 8.689968 0.081573 
Feb-93 3 0.5 597529 298764.5 -2.00132 8.689968 -1.93758 
Mar-93 9 0.5 597529 298764.5 0.109047 8.689968 0.081573 
Apr-93 10 0.5 597529 298764.5 0.460775 8.689968 0.534215 
May-93 8 0.5 597529 298764.5 -0.24268 8.689968 -0.1844 
Jun-93 9 0.5 597529 298764.5 0.109047 8.689968 0.081573 
Jul-93 10 0.5 597529 298764.5 0.460775 8.689968 0.534215 
Aug-93 19 0.5 597529 298764.5 3.626332 8.689968 2.318851 
Sep-93 5 0.5 597529 298764.5 -1.29787 8.689968 -1.3294 
Oct-93 6 0.5 597529 298764.5 -0.94614 8.689968 -1.07519 
Nov-93 7 0.5 597529 298764.5 -0.59441 8.689968 -0.65639 
Dec-93 8 0.5 597529 298764.5 -0.24268 8.689968 -0.1844 
Jan-94 5 0.2 639882 127976.4 -0.36846 6.048667 -0.33208 
Feb-94 4 0.2 639882 127976.4 -0.71982 6.048667 -0.76179 
Mar-94 5 0.2 639882 127976.4 -0.36846 6.048667 -0.33208 
Apr-94 7 0.2 639882 127976.4 0.334262 6.048667 0.332082 
May-94 5 0.2 639882 127976.4 -0.36846 6.048667 -0.33208 
Jun-94 3 0.2 639882 127976.4 -1.07118 6.048667 -1.1517 
Jul-94 10 0.2 639882 127976.4 1.388346 6.048667 1.436513 
Aug-94 11 0.5 639882 319941 0.699216 9.01747 0.87661 
Sep-94 3 0.5 639882 319941 -2.1223 9.01747 -2.31885 
Oct-94 10 0.5 639882 319941 0.346527 9.01747 0.375528 
Nov-94 5 0.5 639882 319941 -1.41692 9.01747 -1.43651 
Dec-94 8 0.5 639882 319941 -0.35885 9.01747 -0.24699 
Jan-95 10 0.5 776238 388119 -0.02568 10.07187 -0.04075 
Feb-95 9 0.5 776238 388119 -0.38293 10.07187 -0.46476 
Mar-95 9 0.5 776238 388119 -0.38293 10.07187 -0.46476 
Apr-95 11 0.5 776238 388119 0.331582 10.07187 0.268071 
May-95 11 0.5 776238 388119 0.331582 10.07187 0.268071 
Jun-95 12 0.5 776238 388119 0.688839 10.07187 0.817831 
Jul-95 13 0.5 776238 388119 1.046097 10.07187 1.151702 
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DATE      LEVEL1    COMMIT   POLBUD  ACCION1   ERROR1        FIT1       N.Scorel 
Aug-95 9 0.5 776238       388119      -0.38293     10.07187    -0.46476 
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APPENDIX C. 
Summary of the data and output from the regression between corruption, measured 
by the number of articles on official corruption published by The Economist (LEVEL2), and 
action against illegal drug trafficking (ACCION1). 
The following is the definition of terms: 
LEVEL2 Number of articles on corruption published by The Economist. 
POLBUD National Police budget in million of pesos (constant 1995 pesos). 
COMMIT Level of commitment to act against the problem. 
ACCION1 Anti-Drug action curve. 
ERROR2 Error terms in the regression. 
FIT2 Regression Fit. 
N.SCORE2 Normal Scores for the error terms. 
QUARTER YEAR LEVEL2 POLBUD COMMIT ACCION1 ERROR2 FIT2 N.Score2 
1st 1985 1 407609 0.3 122282.7 -0.43183 1.950769 -0.35359 
2nd 2 407609 0.3 122282.7 0.02236 1.95077 0.232926 
3rd 0 407609 0.3 122282.7 -0.88602 1.95077 -1.12486 
4th 1 407609 0.3 122282.7 -0.43183 1.95077 -0.41585 
1st 1986 1 407505 0.3 122251.5 -0.43166 1.950383 -0.2627 
2nd 1 407505 0.3 122251.5 -0.43166 1.950383 -0.2627 
3rd 0 407505 0.25 101876.3 -0.77364 1.697252 -1.02122 
4th 0 407505 0.2 81501 -0.66144 1.444122 -0.8416 
1st 1987 1 465074 0.2 93014.8 -0.26816 1.587163 -0.08665 
2nd 1 465074 0.2 93014.8 -0.26816 1.587163 -0.08665 
3rd 2 465074 0.2 93014.8 0.188545 1.587163 0.323 
4th 2 465074 0.2 93014.8 0.188545 1.587163 0.323 
1st 1988 3 482868 0.3 144860.4 0.348265 2.231262 0.579769 
2nd 4 482868 0.3 144860.4 0.801299 2.231262 1.071593 
3rd 4 482868 0.3 144860.4 0.801299 2.231262 1.071593 
4th 3 482868 0.3 144860.4 0.348265 2.231262 0.579769 
1st 1989 2 491197 0.3 147359.1 -0.11881 2.262305 0.115655 
2nd 3 491197 0.3 147359.1 0.334137 2.262305 0.479805 
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QUARTER YEAR LEVEL2 POLBUD COMMIT ACCION1 ERROR2 FIT2 N.Score2 
4th 4 491197 0.5 245598.5 0.235831 3.482774 0.415851 
1st 1990 4 408711 0.5 204355.5 0.466571 2.970395 0.761474 
2nd 2 408711 0.5 204355.5 -0.43974 2.970395 -0.47981 
3rd 3 408711 0.35 143048.8 0.358515 2.208756 0.686043 
4th 4 408711 0.2 81742.2 1.169198 1.447119 1.380058 
1st 1991 3 427667 0.2 85533.4 0.688954 1.494218 0.883779 
2nd 1 427667 0.2 85533.4 -0.22612 1.494218 0 
3rd 3 427667 0.2 85533.4 0.688954 1.494218 0.883779 
4th 0 427667 0.2 85533.4 -0.68366 1.494218 -0.92762 
1st 1992 1 500478 0.2 100095.6 -0.30785 1.67513 -0.17398 
2nd 4 500478 0.2 100095.6 1.060119 1.67513 1.242335 
3rd 1 500478 0.5 250239 -1.15948 3.540425 -1.55033 
4th . 0 500478 0.5 250239 -1.61589 3.540425 -2.1869 
1st 1993 3 597529 0.5 298764.5 -0.52941 4.143277 -0.64979 
2nd 1 597529 0.5 298764.5 -1.45554 4.143277 -1.78231 
3rd 3 597529 0.5 298764.5 -0.52941 4.143277 -0.64979 
4th 4 597529 0.5 298764.5 -0.06635 4.143277 0.173983 
1st 1994 0 639882 0.2 127976.4 -0.91743 2.021505 -1.24233 
2nd 1 639882 0.2 127976.4 -0.4636 2.021505 -0.54584 
3rd 1 639882 0.35 223958.7 -1.00557 3.213933 -1.38006 
4th 3 639882 0.5 319941 -0.65692 4.406362 -0.76147 
1st 1995 5 776238 0.5 388119 -0.12305 5.253366 0.057728 
2nd 8 776238 0.5 388119 1.333884 5.253366 1.655358 
3rd 8 776238 0.5 388119 1.333884 5.253366 1.655358 
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